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Time is an important but limited resource, and consumers are constantly looking for ways to get 
more from their time. This has led to the popularity of scheduling as a strategy to help consumers 
manage and organize their time. Although scheduling is both highly recommended and widely 
adopted, surprisingly little is known about the psychological effects of scheduling. In this 
dissertation, I explore the potential effects of scheduling for task enjoyment, perceived time, and 
time consumption, finding that scheduling may have some important hidden costs. 
In the first chapter, I examine the effect of scheduling leisure activities. While prior 
research has demonstrated many benefits to scheduling in the work domain, the leisure domain 
has remained unexplored in the literature. I propose that scheduling uniquely undermines the 
benefits of leisure activities. In particular, I argue that by imposing temporal structure on 
otherwise free-flowing leisure activities, scheduling can lead leisure to feel more like work and 
 x 
 
 
 
reduce both the anticipation and consumption utility for the scheduled activity. In thirteen studies 
using unambiguous leisure activities that consumers commonly schedule (e.g., movies, a coffee 
break), I find that scheduling a leisure activity (vs. experiencing it impromptu) makes it feel less 
free-flowing and more work-like. Furthermore, scheduling diminishes utility from leisure 
activities, in terms of both excitement in anticipation of the activities and experienced 
enjoyment. Importantly, I find that maintaining the free-flowing nature of the activity by 
“roughly scheduling” (without pre-specified times) eliminates this effect, thus indicating that the 
effect is driven by a detriment from scheduling rather than by a boost from spontaneity. Finally, 
the effects of scheduling are unique to leisure and do not occur for work activities. Thus, by 
examining scheduling outside of the work domain, I am able to identify and demonstrate an 
important detriment to scheduling. 
Having examined the effect of scheduling on the individual scheduled tasks, in the 
second chapter, I next examine the effect of scheduling on the time surrounding scheduled tasks. 
That is, consumers often organize their time by scheduling some tasks while also leaving some 
time unaccounted. I examine whether the presence of scheduled tasks systematically influences 
the perception and ultimate consumption of intervals of unaccounted time. Across nine studies 
conducted in both the lab and field, I find that bounded intervals (i.e., that end in a scheduled 
task) feel prospectively shorter than equivalent-length intervals that are unbounded, leading 
consumers to use this time differently.  I propose that this temporal contraction of bounded time 
is driven by attentional narrowing, whereby salient future tasks loom nearer, making the distance 
to these tasks feel shorter. In line with this, I find that only terminating (vs. initiating) boundary 
 xi 
 
 
 
tasks that mark the interval endpoint contract time.  Finally, in line with the notion that once time 
feels short it may also feel scarce and insufficient for completing tasks, I find that consumers 
become less willing to spend their time once it is bounded, forgoing in particular relatively 
extended (though feasible) and productive tasks in favor of shorter and more easily accomplished 
tasks. This chapter identifies unique outcomes of scheduling, finding that how consumers 
organize their tasks impacts not only the scheduled activities, but also consumers’ perceived time 
and decisions of how to consume their available time throughout the day. My results show that 
scheduling can inadvertently contract the perception and consumption of unaccounted time. 
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Chapter 1 
The Calendar Mindset: Scheduling Takes the 
Fun Out and Puts the Work In1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Consumers often feel pressed for time as they face conflicting goals that compete for this 
limited resource (Etkin, Evangelidis, and Aaker 2014). To better manage their time, consumers 
are often advised to schedule their various activities (Bond and Feather 1988; Kaufman-
Scarborough and Lindquist 2003). Consumers seem to have embraced this recommendation, 
particularly with the advent of smartphones and tablets: 22% of online U.S. adults maintain a 
calendar on their mobile device (Paul 2011), accessing their calendar five or more times per day 
(Ahonen 2013). Furthermore, consumers are scheduling not only work activities, which are 
traditionally scheduled, but also their leisure activities (Robinson and Godbey 1997; Southerton 
2003, 2006). A recent Wall Street Journal article (Sovich 2016) argues that scheduling is quickly 
becoming the default for leisure activities, such that restaurant reservations are made days in 
                                                 
1 The paper based on the first chapter of my dissertation is published in the Journal of Marketing Research: 
Tonietto, Gabriela N., and Selin A. Malkoc (2016), “The Calendar Mindset: Scheduling Takes the Fun Out and Puts 
the Work In” Journal of Marketing Research, 53 (6), 922-936, http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmr.14.0591  
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advance and even off-times for movies sell out with pre-purchased tickets. Although there is 
reason to believe that scheduling may help consumers take part in more experiences, these 
changes in consumer behavior prompt an important consideration about the quality of each 
experience: How does scheduling influence the way leisure activities are construed, evaluated, 
and experienced? 
In this chapter of my dissertation, I examine this question and demonstrate that 
scheduling a leisure activity (vs. experiencing it impromptu) can have unintended negative 
consequences. In particular, I suggest that, when scheduled, leisure activities start to feel like 
work, which decreases the utility consumers obtain in terms of both excitement in anticipation of 
the activity and experienced enjoyment. This is because scheduling temporally structures 
otherwise free-flowing leisure activities, making them feel more like work. As such, the decrease 
in anticipation and consumption utility can be remedied by “roughly scheduling” (i.e., without 
pre-specified times) in a manner that does not temporally structure leisure activities, thus 
indicating that the effect is driven by a detriment from scheduling and not by a boost from 
spontaneity. 
It is important to note that I do not suggest that consumers should throw away their 
calendars and stop scheduling activities. Prior research has established clear benefits for 
scheduling (Bond and Feather 1988; Milkman et al. 2012), which I do not dispute. I simply 
suggest that scheduling leisure activities may undermine these benefits and reduce consumers’ 
utility. In doing so, I examine activities that are distinctly intended as leisure, relatively short 
(i.e., a few hours), and commonly scheduled by consumers (e.g., movies, ice cream with a friend, 
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a coffee break) but that may vary in their level of social commitment, external demands, and 
frequency. I consistently demonstrate that scheduling diminishes utility in terms of both 
excitement in anticipation of the activity and experienced enjoyment. 
My findings make two main contributions. First, scheduling is increasingly prevalent and 
regularly influences consumer behavior. However, its potential downsides are not well 
understood. My work is the first to establish the potential negative consequences of scheduling 
as well as the first to suggest possible remedies to these negative consequences. Thus, my 
findings have important implications for consumer well-being. Second, my work adds to the 
literature on how external factors might undermine intrinsic processes. Consumers often have 
high levels of intrinsic motivation to engage in leisure activities (Choi and Fishbach 2011); prior 
research has demonstrated that several factors, including external rewards (Deci 1971; Lepper, 
Greene, and Nisbett 1973) and personal quantification (Etkin 2016), can undermine such 
intrinsic motivation. I contribute to this literature by showing that scheduling—a behavior that is 
often self-imposed and well-intentioned—can undermine consumers’ intrinsic motivation, 
making otherwise fun activities feel like work. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 Impromptu versus Scheduled Leisure 
 
Consumers often divide their time into two important categories: scheduled and 
impromptu. That is, they schedule several of their activities and also leave some “free” time open 
for more impromptu activities (Southerton 2003). However, relatively little is known about the 
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associations consumers may have with these behaviors. Impromptu behavior, often associated 
with a lack of planning and preparation, is performed on the spur of the moment. Although lay 
intuition would suggest a positive association between spontaneity and fun, findings by Unger 
and Kernan (1983) challenge this notion. The authors argue and demonstrate that spontaneity is 
neither a necessary component of leisure nor a reliable predictor of satisfaction with leisure 
activities. Thus, the benefits of spontaneity are not perfectly clear, and there may even be 
potential detriments to impromptu behavior for consumers, who often perceive little spare time 
in the present (Jhang and Lynch 2015). 
In contrast to behaving in an impromptu manner, scheduling involves planning 
beforehand; to schedule is to plan (an event) to take place at a particular time. Thus, scheduling 
temporally structures activities by specifically allocating time to designated activities. Specific 
time allocation (often with the use of schedules and calendars) allows for better accounting of 
one’s time (Bond and Feather 1988; KaufmanScarborough and Lindquist 2003), aids in time 
management, and reduces anxiety associated with busyness (KaufmanScarborough and Lindquist 
2003; Southerton 2003). Scheduling may also increase the likelihood of engaging in the target 
activity by serving as an imposed deadline or a pre-commitment tool (Kivetz and Simonson 
2002; Milkman et al. 2012; Shu and Gneezy 2010; Wertenbroch 1998). Importantly, however, 
this line of research has predominately focused on the work domain and has not examined how 
scheduling might change the perception of and utility from leisure activities. 
1.2.2 Scheduling Leisure 
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Consumers engage in two broad types of activities: work and leisure. I suggest that this 
distinction is critical in understanding how consumers react to scheduling. Work activities are 
instrumental in nature and extrinsically motivated (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994; Laran and 
Janiszewski 2011), done out of obligation (Southerton and Tomlinson 2005), and perceived as 
effortful and chore-like (Choi and Fishbach 2011). These activities can include one’s actual work 
(i.e., paid work) or one’s chores that are instrumental in achieving personal goals (i.e., unpaid 
work), both of which are considered unavoidable or necessary (Southerton 2006; Southerton and 
Tomlinson 2005). Leisure activities, conversely, are those in which a person can do whatever 
(s)he wants as opposed to what (s)he must do; these are, by definition, enjoyable. Leisure 
activities are noninstrumental and intrinsically motivated (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994; 
Laran and Janiszewski 2011; Unger and Kernan 1983), viewed as nonproductive use of time 
(Veblen [1899] 1979, p. 43), and marked by the pursuit of pleasure and opportunities to have fun 
(Keinan and Kivetz 2011). 
Importantly, consumers perceive and experience time differently when engaged in work 
versus leisure activities. In particular, consumers have a close association between subjective 
time progression and fun, exemplified by the common lay belief that “time flies when you’re 
having fun” (Conti 2001; Gable and Poole 2012; Sackett et al. 2010). When time passes quickly, 
consumers tend to evaluate activities as more fun (Sackett et. al 2010); conversely, when 
activities are evaluated as more fun, time is perceived as passing more quickly (Gable and Poole 
2012). Relatedly, consumers who are intrinsically (vs. extrinsically) motivated to complete a task 
do not pay as much attention to time, leading the activity to feel free-flowing (Conti 2001). This 
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association is well-founded, as most leisure activities are flexible and unstructured, whereas 
work tasks often have pre-specified start and/or completion times (Bird and Ross 1993; Conti 
2000). Note that while not all leisure activities are inherently unstructured (e.g., a yoga class or a 
movie starts at a particular time), the perception of flexibility and flow exist for most intrinsically 
motivated leisure activities (Conti 2001). If consumers perceive leisure activities to be free-
flowing, then one would expect scheduling, which imposes a temporal structure (i.e., specific 
times to start and/or complete the task), to make leisure activities feel less free-flowing and thus 
more work-like. As such, I predict a detriment from scheduling and not a boost from impromptu 
activities. This is consistent with recent work demonstrating that quantification of leisure 
activities can change how work-like they feel (Etkin 2016). 
1.2.3 When Leisure Becomes Work: The Effect on Utility 
 
If scheduled leisure activities take on work-like qualities, this would likely have 
important downstream consequences. Research to date examining how work versus leisure 
activities are evaluated has established that work activities are associated with more negative 
experiences and evaluations than tasks performed for leisure (Choi and Fishbach 2011; Fishbach, 
Shah, and Kruglanski 2004; Higgins and Trope 1990; Laran and Janiszewski 2011). This 
research manipulated the framing (i.e., work or fun) of activities that cannot be clearly classified 
as work or leisure. For instance, reading can feel effortful, chore-like (Choi and Fishbach 2011), 
and depleting (Laran and Janiszewski 2011) if done to achieve a work goal (e.g., study), but it 
may be experienced as purely enjoyable if performed for leisure. If so, one would expect tasks 
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that are construed as work-like to have diminished utility—both from anticipation as well as 
from actual consumption. However, unlike the prior research demonstrating how work versus 
leisure goals alter the experience of an ambiguous activity, I argue that a subtle manipulation 
(i.e., scheduling) of an unambiguous leisure activity can make the activity feel more like work 
and decrease utility. In doing so, I examine utility both from anticipation and from consumption. 
That is, I explore how excited (vs. more reluctant or resentful) consumers feel in anticipation of 
the activity as well as how much they enjoy the activity once it is actually consumed. I suggest 
that both sources of utility can be diminished for scheduled leisure. 
Next, I report results from 13 studies using a host of domains in the lab and in the field. 
Together, my results provide support for the detrimental effect of scheduling on how leisure 
activities are anticipated and experienced. In particular, I demonstrate that (1) when leisure 
activities are scheduled, they take on qualities of work, leading to lower utility; (2) this effect is 
observed only when the scheduling is specific (vs. rough or absent); and (3) this effect is unique 
to leisure (vs. work) activities. Study 1 (and six additional supplemental studies) establishes that 
scheduling leisure activities leads them to take on work-like qualities, while Study 2 shows that 
even an impromptu activity can feel like work if it is temporally structured (i.e., partitioned into 
temporal segments). Study 3 establishes that the difference in utility for scheduled versus 
impromptu activities is driven by an imposition of temporal structure by demonstrating that 
roughly planning (without predetermined times) does not lead to the detrimental effect of 
scheduling for anticipation utility. Study 4 demonstrates that setting only a start time is enough 
structure to lead to the effect of scheduling, and Study 5 shows that scheduling uniquely affects 
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leisure and not work activities. Finally, Studies 6a and 6b test the effect of scheduling on 
consumption utility. I find that scheduling to watch a fun video (vs. watching it impromptu) 
leads to greater work construal and decreases enjoyment (Study 6a) and that students enjoy a 
coffee break less if they specifically (vs. roughly) scheduled their break (Study 6b). Although 
each study isolates a single important aspect of my conceptual framework, they collectively 
support the proposition that scheduling leisure activities can infuse them with work-like qualities 
and decrease utility. 
1.3 Study 1: Effect of Scheduling on Work Qualities 
 
The purpose of Study 1 is to examine whether scheduled leisure activities take on work-
like qualities. I first conducted a pretest to identify appropriate measures to gauge the qualities of 
work. I asked 52 undergraduate students to define work in their own words and provide 
examples of work activities. Almost half (44%) of participants defined work in terms of required 
effort/energy, 15% defined work as obligatory (e.g., “obligation,” “must be done”), and 19% 
provided chores as an example of work. These findings are consistent with the literature (Choi 
and Fishbach 2011; Southerton and Tomlinson 2005; Warren 2011), which has consistently de- 
fined work as effortful, necessary, unavoidable, and chore-like. As such, in the ensuing studies I 
measure work by using a varying subset of the following items: “effortful,” “chore,” 
“obligation,” “commitment,” “constraining,” and “work.” In the main experiment, I provided 
participants with a fictitious schedule for the week. Half imagined scheduling a leisure activity in 
 9 
 
 
 
advance, while the other half imagined engaging in the same activity impromptu. All participants 
indicated how they would feel about this activity immediately before it took place.  
1.3.1 Method and Procedure 
 
Sixty-eight undergraduate students took part in this two-cell (scheduled vs. impromptu) 
study. All participants were given a calendar filled with classes and extracurricular activities (see 
Appendix 1.1) and were asked to imagine that this was their actual schedule for the week. Those 
in the scheduled condition first made plans to get frozen yogurt with a friend two days in 
advance and added the plans to their hypothetical calendar. Next, they completed a set of filler 
questions about their week. Finally, they were asked to imagine that it was now right before their 
get-together, and they rated the extent to which the activity felt like work (“commitment,” 
“chore”; α = .61) on nine-point scales (1 = “not at all,” and 9 = “extremely”). Those in the 
impromptu condition imagined running into a friend and deciding to get frozen yogurt together 
immediately and rated the activity on the same items. In both conditions, the time and date for 
the activity was the same. 
1.3.2 Results  
 
As predicted, those who scheduled getting frozen yogurt construed it more like work (M 
= 5.04) than those in the impromptu condition (M = 3.44; t(66) = 4.06, p < .01). Examining each 
of the measures independently led to the same conclusions: scheduling increased ratings of the 
commitment and chore items (Mcommitment = 6.06, Mchore = 4.03) compared with experiencing it 
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impromptu (Mcommitment = 4.03, t(66) = 4.22, p < .01; Mchore = 2.85, t(66) = 2.48, p < .05). This 
study provides initial evidence that scheduling leads leisure activities to take on qualities of 
work.  
1.3.3 Discussion and Studies 1b–1g 
 
The finding from Study 1a, while compelling, leaves many questions unanswered. For 
instance, would the effect hold if the calendar provided were not as busy, or even if it were 
completely free? What if the event were recurring, had externally imposed timetables, or were a 
special occasion—would these factors eliminate the effect? Similarly, would the effect persist if 
the task were not initiated by someone else and instead were either self-initiated or even solitary? 
To rule out these alternatives, test for robustness, and better understand the conditions under 
which the effect unfolds, I conducted a series of strategic replications (for details, see 
Supplemental Studies 1.1-1.6). In Supplemental Study 1.1, I find that the effect of scheduling 
(vs. impromptu) leisure on work construal holds even when the calendar shown to participants is 
completely free (Mscheduled = 3.31, Mimpromptu = 2.15; t(58) = 2.15, p < .05), suggesting that 
perceived busyness in the scheduling conditions does not drive the results. I further find that the 
effect is robust to activities that are recurring (i.e., take place every week, rather than once; 
Supplemental Study 1.2: Mscheduled = 3.64, Mimpromptu = 3.10; t(107) = 2.16, p < .05); to activities 
with externally imposed timetables (i.e., intramural volleyball game; Supplemental Study 1.3: 
Mscheduled = 4.11, Mimpromptu = 3.25; t(111) = 3.34, p < .01); and even to rare, special events (i.e., a 
special movie preview where the star actor and director sign autographs; Supplemental Study 
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1.4: Mscheduled = 3.47, Mimpromptu = 2.53; t(73) = 2.35, p < .05), indicating that the results are not 
driven by degree of predictability and are robust to differences in the nature of the leisure task. 
Perhaps more importantly, the results were replicated when the activity was initiated by the 
participants (rather than their friends, as in my previous studies; Supplemental Study 1.5: 
Mscheduled = 4.17, Mimpromptu = 3.42; t(74) = 2.11, p < .05) or was completed alone (Supplemental 
Study 1.6: Mscheduled = 3.67, Mimpromptu = 2.61; t(77) = 2.57, p < .05). Thus, the effect of 
scheduling on the work construal of leisure activities is robust to the removal of social 
considerations, in rejection of the notion that the effect was simply due to an increased sense of 
social commitment or obligation. Taken together, I find that scheduling leisure increases work 
construal when the calendar is busy (Study 1) or not busy (Supplemental Study 1.1), as well as 
when the leisure activity is recurring (Supplemental Study 1.2), occurs on an external timetable 
(Supplemental Study 1.3), is rather special (Supplemental Study 1.4), is with a friend (Study 1), 
is solitary (Supplemental Study 1.6), or is self- or friend-initiated (Supplemental Study 1.5). 
These findings (see Table 1.1, Panel A) help establish that scheduling leisure activities leads 
such activities to take on qualities of work.  
Note that in these studies I used a combination of items such as “effortful,” “chore,” 
“obligation,” “commitment,” “constraining,” and “like work” to measure work construal. As 
such, one might wonder whether the effect of scheduling captures changes in obligation and 
commitment rather than work construal. To examine this alternative, I re-conducted analyses 
without these two items where possible. For six out of seven studies, the results were statistically 
unaltered when these items were excluded (see Table 1.1, Panel B). Furthermore, using 
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standardized scores of work construal (that excluded obligation and commitment items) to 
conduct a meta-analysis across the five two-cell design studies results in a strong effect on this 
reduced set of measures (Mscheduled = .22, Mimpromptu = −.21, p < .001). Taken together, I find that 
the effect of scheduling on work construal holds in the absence of these items, demonstrating that 
the work measure captures more than mere commitment. Thus far, I have shown that scheduling 
leisure activities makes them feel more like work. I suggest that scheduling does so by imposing 
temporal structure. If this is the case, then imposing temporal structure even on impromptu 
leisure tasks should likewise increase work construal. I test this possibility next.  
TABLE 1.1 – SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1 RESULTS  
Panel A: Results for Work Construal Measure 
 Work measure Scheduled Impromptu 
Start time 
scheduled 
Roughly 
scheduled 
Activity 
Additional 
takeaways 
1a 
Chore, 
commitment 
5.04 3.44***   
Frozen 
yogurt 
 
1b 
Obligation, 
commitment 
3.31 2.15**   Movie 
Robustness check:  
free calendar 
1c 
Chore, 
obligation, 
effortful 
3.64 3.10**   
Frozen 
yogurt 
Robustness check: 
recurring activity 
1d 
Chore, effortful, 
work 
4.11 3.25**   Volleyball 
Robustness check: 
structured activity 
1e 
Chore, 
obligation 
3.47 2.53**   Movie 
Robustness check: 
special occasion 
1f 
Chore, 
obligation, 
commitment 
4.17 3.42**   Movie 
Robustness check: 
self-initiated 
activity 
1g 
Chore, 
obligation, 
commitment 
3.67 2.61**   Movie 
Robustness check: 
solitary activity 
2 
Chore, effortful, 
work 
Control: 3.10 
Structured: 3.10 
Control: 2.30** 
Structured: 3.33 
  
Forest 
Preserve 
Moderator: 
temporal structure 
4 
Chore, effortful, 
work 
3.30 2.43*** 2.95  Frisbee 
Mediator: 
free-flow 
5 
Chore, effortful, 
obligation 
Leisure: 3.75 
Work: 4.90 
Leisure: 2.67*** 
Work: 4.57 
  
Leisure: 
test drive 
Work: car 
wash 
Moderator: 
task type 
6a Work–fun 5.24 5.64**   Video  
Panel B: Results for Work Construal Measure Excluding Commitment and Obligationa 
 Work measure Scheduled Impromptu 
Start time 
scheduled 
Roughly 
scheduled 
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1a Chore 4.03 2.85**     
1c Chore, effortful 3.38 2.93*     
1e Chore 3.18 2.14**     
1f Chore 2.84 2.55     
1g Chore 4.29 3.31**     
5 Chore, effortful 
Test drive: 3.68 
Car wash: 4.63 
Test drive: 2.51** 
Car wash: 4.18 
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Panel C: Results for Utility Measure 
 Utility measure Scheduled Impromptu 
Start time 
scheduled 
Roughly 
scheduled 
Activity 
Additional 
takeaway 
3 
Anticipation 
utilityb 
4.92 5.42***  5.28** Froyo 
Moderator: 
roughly scheduling 
4 
Anticipation 
utilityb 
4.51 5.20*** 4.84  Frisbee 
Mediators: 
free-flow, work 
5 
Anticipation 
utilityb 
Leisure: 4.97 
Work: 4.02 
Leisure: 5.60*** 
Work: 4.00 
  
Leisure: 
test drive 
Work: car 
wash 
Moderator: 
task type 
6a Enjoyment 5.43 5.83**   Video  
6b Enjoyment 6.48   7.57*** 
Coffee 
break 
 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p <.0; Significance reported compared to scheduled condition 
a This section only reports studied that originally used commitment and obligation 
b Studies measuring Anticipation utility used the following items: Excited, thrilled, looking forward, reluctantc, unenthusiasticc, 
resentfulc 
c Reverse-scored 
 
1.4 Study 2: Temporally Structuring Impromptu Leisure 
 
Study 2 tests whether temporally structuring even an impromptu activity by partitioning it 
into temporal segments can lead the activity to feel more like work, even in the absence of a 
priori scheduling. If so, this would support the notion that temporal structure drives the effect of 
scheduling. Put differently, temporally structuring a leisure activity by either partitioning it into 
temporal segments or scheduling it should make it feel more like work by reducing perceived 
free-flow. To test whether my partitioning manipulation indeed influenced perceived free-flow, I 
asked 62 participants to rate a leisure activity that was (vs. was not) temporally structured on two 
seven-point scales (1 = “very rigid,” and 7 = “very free-flowing”; 1= “very restrictive,” and 7 = 
“very flexible”; α = .93). As expected, once partitioned into temporal segments, the activity felt 
less free-flowing (Mstructured = 3.28, Mcontrol = 4.56; t(60) = 3.49, p < .01).  
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1.4.1 Method and Procedure  
 
Two hundred one Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in this 2 
(scheduled vs. impromptu) × 2 (control vs. structured) between-subjects study. Participants were 
shown a weekend calendar (see Appendix 1.2). Those in the scheduled conditions imagined that 
it was Saturday morning and that they decided to go to the forest preserve with friends on 
Sunday at 12:00 P.M. Those in the impromptu conditions imagined that it was 11:00 A.M. on 
Sunday morning and that they made the same plans to be acted on in one hour. Regardless of the 
assigned scheduling condition, all participants in the control conditions were told the start time 
for the activity (i.e., noon) and read that “there are several activities to take part in [at the forest 
preserve]. Based on availability, you will try to sign up for two activities and have a picnic in 
between.” Those in the structured conditions received more information regarding the timing of 
various activities and were told that “there are several activities to take part in [at the forest 
preserve], some taking place from 12:30 P.M. to 2:00 P.M. and others from 3:00 P.M. to 4:30 
P.M. Based on availability, you will try to sign up for an activity for each time slot once you get 
there, leaving 2:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M. to have a picnic for an hour in between.” Finally, I 
measured work construal by having participants rate the extent to which the activity felt like a 
chore, like work, and effortful to do (α = .92).  
1.4.2 Results and Discussion  
 
A 2 (temporal structure) × 2 (scheduling) analysis of variance produced a significant 
main effect of temporal structure (F(1, 197) = 4.07, p < .05) such that, overall, structuring the 
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experience led to greater work construal (M = 3.21) than not imposing such temporal structure 
(M = 2.70). There was no significant main effect of scheduling (F(1, 197) = 1.28, p > .10). 
Importantly, I found the predicted temporal structure by scheduling interaction (F(1, 197) = 4.19, 
p < .05; see Figure 1.1). In the control condition, scheduling the leisure activity led it to feel 
more work-like (M = 3.10) than when it was impromptu (M = 2.30; t(197) = 2.26, p < .05). No 
such difference emerged for those in the temporal structure condition (Mscheduled = 3.10, Mimpromptu 
= 3.33; t(197) < 1). Importantly, I observed the effect of temporal structure for those participants 
in the impromptu (t(197) = 2.87, p < .01) conditions but not for those in the scheduled conditions 
(t(197) < 1). This effect is noteworthy, as it establishes that when the event is already scheduled 
and thus is temporally structured, additional structuring does not have a further effect. However, 
when an impromptu task is structured, it feels more like a scheduled task.  
FIGURE 1.1 – STUDY 2 RESULTS 
 
Study 2 demonstrates that temporal structuring underlies the effect of scheduling. In 
particular, I find that increasing the structure in how time will be allocated increases the work 
construal of leisure activities. Importantly, this additional structure moderates the effect of 
scheduling such that the impromptu condition becomes just as work-like as the scheduled 
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condition under increased temporal structure. Thus, Study 2 demonstrates that imposing structure 
and reducing the free-flowing nature of leisure activities by either scheduling or temporally 
partitioning the activity leads to greater work construal. If temporally structuring impromptu 
activities makes them feel like work, then one would expect unstructured scheduling (i.e., 
without specifically allocating one’s time) of leisure activities to behave similarly to impromptu 
leisure. That is, the negative effect of scheduling should occur only when the scheduling is 
relatively structured (with specific time allocation) and not when scheduling is rough (without 
specific time allocation). I examine this issue next while studying the consequences of 
scheduling for anticipation utility. 
1.5 Study 3: Specific versus Rough Scheduling 
 
To test whether rough scheduling moderates the effect of scheduling, in Study 3 I 
introduced an additional condition in which participants roughly scheduled (i.e., without setting 
specific start or end times) a leisure activity ahead of time. I expected that only specific 
scheduling—and not just any plan—would decrease anticipation utility. As before, I first tested 
whether the rough scheduling manipulation indeed felt more free-flowing than specific 
scheduling. One hundred MTurk workers imagined seeing a movie with a friend that took place 
impromptu, after specific scheduling, or after rough scheduling. All participants rated the activity 
on the same free-flow measures as before. I found that specific scheduling (M = 3.83) led the 
activity to feel less free-flowing than when it was impromptu (M = 5.19, t(97) = −3.45, p < .01) 
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or roughly scheduled (M = 4.76, t(97) = − 2.44, p < .05). The impromptu and roughly scheduled 
conditions did not differ from each other (t(97) = 1.13, p > .10).  
1.5.1 Method and Procedure  
 
One hundred sixty-three undergraduates took part in this study. I compared the 
anticipation utility of getting frozen yogurt with a friend when the outing was specifically 
scheduled (i.e., with set times), roughly scheduled (i.e., no set time), or impromptu. All 
participants were provided with a two-day calendar (see Appendix 1.3) and were asked to 
imagine that it was their actual calendar for Monday and Tuesday. Participants in the specific 
scheduling condition imagined that it was Monday morning and that they made plans to get 
frozen yogurt with a friend at 4:00 P.M. Tuesday afternoon. Participants were then instructed to 
add the plan to their calendar. In the rough scheduling condition, participants imagined that it 
was Monday morning and that they made a plan with a friend to get frozen yogurt sometime 
during a gap of a few hours on their calendar between their last class and a meeting (for exact 
instructions, see Appendix 1.4). They were then instructed to add this rough plan to their 
calendar (participants engaged in multiple behaviors including writing question marks, shading a 
large area of the calendar, and drawing arrows outside of the calendar). Thus, in both scheduling 
conditions (specific and rough), participants themselves marked their plans on their hypothetical 
calendar. Finally, participants in the impromptu condition imagined that as they left class 
Tuesday at 4:00 P.M., they ran into a friend and decided to get frozen yogurt immediately. 
Drawing on conceptualizations of anticipation utility from prior research (Loewenstein 1987; 
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Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001), I used a series of anticipatory emotions to capture anticipation 
utility. Participants rated the extent to which they felt three negative (“resentful,” 
“unenthusiastic,” “reluctant”) and three positive (“excited,” “thrilled,” “looking forward to it”) 
emotions in anticipation of the activity.  
 
1.5.2 Results and Discussion  
 
Because all the emotion items were highly reliable (α = .78), I combined them into an 
index measure by reverse coding the negative emotions. Using this index as the dependent 
variable, I found a significant effect of scheduling type (F(2, 160) = 5.07, p < .01). Planned 
contrasts showed that participants who specifically scheduled this get-together had lower 
anticipation utility (M = 4.92) compared with those who roughly scheduled it (M = 5.28; t(160) 
= −2.24, p < .05) or decided impromptu (M = 5.42; t(160) = −3.09, p < .01). Importantly, the 
rough scheduling and impromptu conditions did not differ (t(160) < 1).  
Study 3 provides evidence that temporal structure drives the effect of scheduling on 
anticipation utility. I find that specifically scheduling a leisure activity had a unique dampening 
effect on the anticipation utility for the activity, such that participants were less excited in 
anticipation of a specifically scheduled leisure activity. However, when the scheduling is rough, 
without pre-allocated times, anticipation utility of the activity is as positive as when the activity 
is impromptu, and significantly greater than when it is specifically scheduled. Furthermore, this 
result shows that the lower utility following specific scheduling is not due to a boost from 
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spontaneity but instead due to a detriment from scheduling, as neither the specific nor the rough 
scheduling conditions had a spontaneous component. Nonetheless, when consumers schedule 
their leisure in a specific manner, I find a reduction in utility even compared with this 
nonspontaneous rough scheduling condition. This effect occurs because roughly scheduling, 
unlike specific scheduling, maintains the perceived free-flowing nature of the activity, as the 
pretest confirms. However, I have not yet directly tested the role of perceived free-flow, an issue 
I address next. 
 
1.6 Study 4: Setting Start Times is Enough Structure 
 
The purpose of Study 4 was twofold. First, I aimed to delve further into the aspects of 
scheduling that are vital to increasing the temporal structure of the activity. Studies thus far have 
operationalized scheduling by setting both start and end times for the activity. Thus, it is not 
clear whether setting only start times would provide enough structure to find the negative effect 
of scheduling. I test this possibility by adding a third condition in which participants scheduled 
only a start time for the activity. Second, I also examined the role of perceived free-flow by 
including measures of free-flow in addition to measures of work construal and anticipation 
utility. 
1.6.1 Method and Procedure  
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One hundred forty-one undergraduates took part in this three-cell (start and end times vs. 
start time only vs. impromptu) between-subjects study. All participants were given a three-day 
calendar (see Appendix 1.5) and were asked to imagine that this was their actual schedule for the 
next few days. Participants in the start and end times scheduling condition imagined that it was 
Monday morning and that they made plans to play Frisbee with friends Wednesday afternoon 
from 4:30 to 6:30 P.M. Participants were asked to add the plan to their calendar. In the start 
time–only scheduling condition, participants imagined that it was Monday morning and that they 
made plans to play Frisbee with friends Wednesday afternoon from 4:30 P.M. onward (without 
setting an end time for the activity—see Appendix 1.6). They were then instructed to add this 
plan to their calendar (participants engaged in multiple behaviors, including blocking off time, 
shading the start time and drawing arrows, etc.). Finally, participants in the impromptu condition 
imagined that as they left class Wednesday at 4:00 P.M., they decided to play Frisbee with 
friends, quickly got ready, and headed there. First, participants indicated work construal of the 
activity (“effortful,” “like a chore,” “like work”; α = .90), followed by anticipation utility using 
the same emotion items as in Study 3 (α = .90). Finally, all participants rated the extent to which 
going from class to play Frisbee felt flexible and free-flowing (α = .90) on seven-point scales (1 
= “not at all,” and 7 = “to a great extent”). 
1.6.2 Results 
 
Free-flowing. I found a significant effect of scheduling condition (F(2, 138) = 5.83, p < 
.01). In particular, participants who scheduled both start and end times (M = 3.90) felt that the 
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activity was less free-flowing compared with those who decided impromptu (M = 4.81; t(138) = 
−3.09, p < .01). Furthermore, those who scheduled only a start time (M = 3.99) also felt that the 
activity was less free-flowing compared with the impromptu condition (t(138) = −2.80, p < .01). 
The two scheduling conditions did not differ from each other (t(138) < 1). Thus, setting only a 
start time was enough to disrupt the perceived free-flow.  
Work construal. I also found a significant effect of scheduling condition (F(2, 138) = 
4.35, p < .05), whereby participants who scheduled both start and end times (M = 3.30) felt that 
the activity was more like work compared with those who decided impromptu (M = 2.43, t(138) 
= 2.93, p < .01). Furthermore, those who scheduled only a start time (M = 2.95) also felt that the 
activity was (marginally) more work-like compared with those in the impromptu condition 
(t(138) = 1.75, p < .10). The two scheduling conditions did not differ from each other (t(138) = 
−1.18, p > .10) such that both led playing Frisbee to feel more like work compared with 
engaging in the activity impromptu. 
Next, I examined whether changes in work construal operated through perceptions of 
free-flow using bootstrapped mediation with 5,000 samples. I first contrast coded scheduling 
conditions into two contrasts (C1: start and end = −1, start only = −1, impromptu = 2; C2: start 
and end = 1, start only = −1, impromptu = 0). I found a significant indirect effect of the 
scheduling C1 contrast on work construal that operated through perceived free-flow (95% 
confidence interval [CI] = [−.183, −.040]; for full regression results, see Figure 1.2, Panel A). 
Thus, scheduling a start time or both start and end times led the activity to feel less free-flowing, 
which then increased the work construal of the activity.  
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Anticipation utility. Replicating Study 3, I found a significant effect of scheduling 
condition on anticipation utility (F(2, 138) = 4.01, p < .05). In particular, participants who 
scheduled both start and end times (M = 4.51) had lower anticipation utility than those who 
decided impromptu (M = 5.20; t(138) = −2.83, p < .01). Those who scheduled only a start time 
(M = 4.84) fell in between the other two conditions, though neither difference reached 
significance (impromptu: t(138) = −1.49, p > .10; start and end: t(138) = 1.34, p > .10). 
Next, I examined whether the effect of scheduling on anticipation utility operated through 
work construal and perceptions of free-flow. A mediation analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 6, 5,000 
bootstrapped samples) produced a significant indirect effect of scheduling C1 contrast through 
perceived free-flow and work construal (95% CI = [.022, .107]; Figure 1.2, Panel B). That is, 
scheduling reduced anticipation utility by disrupting the free-flowing nature of the leisure 
activity, which then led the activity to feel more like work.  
FIGURE 1.2 – STUDY 4 MEDIATION RESULTS 
Panel A: Mediation of Work Construal 
 
Work 
Construal 
Free-Flowing 
Scheduling 
β = -0.14 (β = -0.23**) 
[CI: -.183, -.040] 
β =0.29** β = -0.33** 
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Panel B: Mediation of Anticipation Utility 
 
1.6.3 Discussion 
 
This study demonstrates that setting only a start time (compared with setting both start 
and end times) is enough structure to reduce the flexibility and free-flowing nature of leisure 
activities. I also found support for a serial mediation. That is, I demonstrate that either type of 
scheduling (vs. impromptu) leads the activity to feel less free-flowing, which then makes the 
activity feel more like work, which then reduces anticipation utility. Note that such a mediation 
model cannot differentiate whether work construal or utility come first in the causal framework. 
That is, it is also possible for utility to feed into work construal or work and utility to operate as 
simultaneous, rather than sequential, outcomes of scheduling. Although I cannot statistically 
isolate the specifics of the causal chain, my results nonetheless establish that scheduling (by 
setting a start time only or a start and an end time) chips away from the anticipation utility of the 
task, makes it feel like work, and decreases its perceived free-flow. 
1.7 Study 5: Scheduling Work Tasks 
 
β = -0.56** 
β = -0.01 (β = -0.18*) 
[CI: .022, .107] 
 
β =0.29** 
β = -0.33** 
β = -0.23** β =0.19** 
Work 
Construal 
Scheduling 
Free-Flowing 
Anticipation 
Utility 
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If the structuring effect of scheduling only influences activities that tend to feel free-
flowing, one should not expect scheduling to alter the construal and utility of work activities, 
which are already associated with temporal structure and are generally not perceived to be free-
flowing (Conti 2000). I examine this issue by manipulating the type of task in addition to 
scheduling. 
1.7.1 Method and Procedure  
 
Two hundred twenty-eight MTurk workers participated in this 2 (task: work vs. leisure) × 
2 (scheduled vs. impromptu) between-subjects study. Participants were shown a weekend 
calendar similar to prior studies. Those in the scheduled conditions imagined that it was Saturday 
morning and that they decided to either get their car washed (work task) or test drive a car 
(leisure task) on Sunday at 3:30 P.M. Those in the impromptu conditions imagined that it was 
3:00 P.M. on Sunday afternoon and they made the same plans to be acted on in half an hour. In 
addition to the emotion items (α = .88) used previously to assess anticipation utility, I added an 
additional overall evaluation measure (seven-point scale: 1 = “can’t wait to go,” and 7 = “wish I 
could cancel”). Finally, I measured work construal (“chore,” “obligation,” “effortful to do”; α = 
.80).  
1.7.2 Results  
 
Work construal. My analysis found a significant main effect of task type (F(1, 224) = 
74.91, p < .01) such that the car wash (M = 4.73) was construed more like work than the test 
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drive (M = 3.21), confirming that the task type manipulation was successful. There was also a 
significant main effect of scheduling (F(1, 224) = 16.27, p < .01), such that those who scheduled 
(M = 4.33) construed the task to be more like work than those who did not schedule (M = 3.62). 
These main effects were qualified by the predicted task × scheduling interaction (F(1, 224) = 
4.53, p < .05; see Figure 1.3, Panel A). That is, when considering a leisure task, those who 
scheduled construed the task as more work-like (M = 3.75) than those who engaged in the task 
impromptu (M = 2.67; t(224) = 4.36, p < .01). No such difference emerged for those who 
evaluated the work task (Mscheduled = 4.90; Mimpromptu = 4.57; t(224) = 1.35, p > .10). 
FIGURE 1.3 – STUDY 5 RESULTS 
Panel A: Task Type by Scheduling on Work Construal 
 
Panel B: Task Type by Scheduling on Anticipatory Emotions 
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Panel C: Task Type by Scheduling on Desire to Cancel 
 
 
Anticipation utility. Examining the emotions index, I found a main effect of task type 
(F(1, 224) = 55.13, p < .01) such that those who considered the car wash (M = 4.01) expressed 
significantly lower anticipation utility than those who considered the test drive (M = 5.28). There 
was also a marginally significant main effect of scheduling (F(1, 224) = 3.22, p = .07) such that 
those who scheduled (M = 4.49) felt less positively about the task than those who did not 
schedule (M = 4.80). These main effects were qualified by a (marginal) interaction (F(1, 224) = 
2.96, p = .06; see Figure 1.3, Panel B). When considering a leisure task, those who scheduled (M 
= 4.97) had lower anticipation utility than those who engaged in the task impromptu (M = 5.60; 
t(224) = −2.60, p = .01). Furthermore, no such difference emerged for those who considered a 
work task (Mscheduled = 4.02; Mimpromptu = 4.00; t(224) < 1).  
To examine whether the effect of scheduling on anticipation utility operated through 
work construal, I ran a moderated mediation analysis (5,000 samples). I found a significant 
indirect effect of the interaction on anticipatory emotions that operated through work construal 
(95% CI = [−.210, −.009]; see Figure 1.4, Panel A for regression results). Further analyses 
revealed that while work construal mediated the effect of scheduling on anticipation utility for 
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the leisure activity (95% CI = [−.484, −.144]), this was not the case for the work task (95% CI = 
[−.213, .021]).  
Next, looking at the overall evaluation, I found a significant main effect for task type 
(F(1, 224) = 15.29, p < .01) such that desire to cancel was greater for the car wash (M = 3.94) 
than the test drive (M = 3.06). There was also a significant main effect of scheduling (F(1, 224) = 
8.37, p < .01) such that those who scheduled (M = 3.83) expressed greater desire to cancel than 
those who did not schedule (M = 3.18). These main effects were qualified by a (marginal) 
interaction (F(1, 224) = 2.96, p = .09; see Figure 1.3, Panel C). When considering a leisure task, 
those who scheduled (M = 3.58) expressed greater desire to cancel than those who engaged in 
the task impromptu (M = 2.54; t(224) = 3.26, p < .01). No such difference emerged for those 
who considered a work task (Mscheduled = 4.07; Mimpromptu = 3.81; t(224) < 1).  
Testing for moderated mediation (5,000 bootstrapped samples), I found a significant 
indirect effect of the interaction on desire to cancel that operated through work construal (95% 
CI = [.012, .260]; see Figure 1.4, Panel B for regression results). Further analyses showed that 
although work construal mediated the effect of scheduling on overall evaluation for the leisure 
activity (95% CI = [.180, .608]), this was not the case for the work task (95% CI = [−.024, 
.264]). 
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FIGURE 1.4 – STUDY 5 MEDIATION RESULTS 
Panel A: Mediation of Anticipatory Emotions 
 
Panel B: Mediation of Desire to Cancel 
 
 
1.7.3 Discussion  
 
In Study 5, I find that scheduling has a unique dampening effect on leisure activities. This 
is because scheduling only affects activities that are generally perceived as free-flowing (i.e., 
leisure). For tasks often associated with temporal structure and specific time allocation (e.g., 
work activities), scheduling does not alter their degree of work construal or the utility consumers 
gain in anticipation of the activities. In addition, I find that scheduling reduces anticipation utility 
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through increased work construal, but only for leisure (vs. work) tasks. Taken together, the 
studies so far provide evidence for my proposed effect. Next, I demonstrate that the results are 
not limited to anticipation and indeed extend to consumption utility. 
1.8 Studies 6a-6b: Non-hypothetical Activities 
 
All of the studies thus far have used a prospective, hypothetical design and measured 
anticipation utility. Thus, one may wonder whether the observed effect would extend to 
consumption utility. To address this possibility, I explore the enjoyment from consuming leisure 
activities that were specifically scheduled compared with impromptu (6a) or roughly scheduled 
(6b), finding that consumers who specifically schedule a leisure activity experience lower 
consumption enjoyment.  
1.8.1 Study 6a  
 
Method and procedure. I recruited 160 MTurk workers to watch and evaluate a ten-
minute entertaining video and then randomly assigned them to either a scheduled or an 
impromptu condition. All participants were first provided with a list of ten popular (i.e., more 
than a million views on YouTube), entertaining videos (e.g., a clip from Whose Line Is It 
Anyway?) and were instructed to select the video that they thought would be the most fun and 
entertaining for them to watch. Given that the task was a “Human Intelligence Task” (HIT) 
posted for MTurk workers, to confirm that the task actually felt like a fun leisure activity, I ran a 
pretest with a separate group of 83 workers who were recruited using the same description and 
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who chose to watch a video from the same list provided in the main study. After watching the 
video, participants rated the task on two scales assessing the degree to which this was a 
work/leisure task (“Having completed this HIT, was it more like work or leisure?” 1 = “more 
like work, and 7 = “more like leisure”) and how fun this task was compared with other MTurk 
HITs (“Compared to other HITs, was this HIT more or less fun?” 1 = “much less fun,” and 7 = 
“much more fun”). I found that participants overwhelmingly considered the task more like 
leisure (M = 6.12, t(82) = 14.74, p < .01, compared with scale midpoint) and much more fun than 
other MTurk HITs (M = 6.47, t(82) = 20.94, p < .01, compared with scale midpoint), indicating 
that this was indeed a fun leisure task for them.  
Following the choice task, participants in the impromptu condition then watched their 
chosen video immediately and answered questions about their viewing experience. Those in the 
scheduled condition instead chose a specific day and time to watch their chosen video and added 
this plan to their calendar. To keep the time of day roughly constant between impromptu and 
scheduled conditions, participants scheduled (on their calendar or planner) the activity over the 
next couple of days during approximately the same time frame as the impromptu condition took 
place (between 9 A.M. and 12 P.M.). After participants indicated the day and time they 
scheduled to watch the video, they were asked to return at their determined time to do so. On the 
day each participant scheduled the task, I sent a reminder e-mail (akin to getting a reminder for 
scheduled tasks on one’s computer or phone). Importantly, when participants in the scheduled 
condition returned to watch their chosen video, I used mild language to avoid evoking any 
negative associations, referring to the activity as their “chosen video” and the time as “set” rather 
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than as “scheduled.” At their scheduled time, participants watched their video and answered 
questions. To assess consumption utility, participants rated how much they enjoyed watching the 
video (1 = “not at all,” and 7 = “extremely”). I measured work construal next by having 
participants rate the extent to which watching the video felt like work/fun (1 = “felt like work,” 
and 7 = “felt like fun”). I also collected several control variables, including gender (male, female, 
other), employment status (unemployed, part-time, full-time, prefer not to answer), how many 
MTurk HITs they do per week, whether they regularly keep a calendar, and how long they 
watched their chosen video. I reasoned that controlling for these variables was crucial in this 
setting to understand the role of scheduling. It is important to control for the variable of keeping 
a regular calendar because the manipulation required the use of one. Similarly, it is important to 
control for employment status because the scheduled task can act as a distraction (and feel like 
work), and assessing participants’ frequency of completing MTurk HITs enables me to control 
for their viewing this HIT as a leisure task. Finally, because the main dependent variable is 
enjoyment, I wanted to control for participants’ actual watching behavior and used the time 
duration that they watched as a proxy. I used all collected covariates in all analyses for both work 
construal and consumption utility.  
Results. Given the time delay in the scheduled condition, I anticipated attrition and thus 
overpopulated this condition (63 in impromptu and 97 in scheduled), and of the 160 participants 
recruited, 146 completed the full study. One hundred percent of the participants in the 
impromptu condition completed the study (as these participants immediately watched their 
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chosen video), and 83 out of the 97 (85.57%) participants assigned to the scheduled condition 
completed the full study. 
In line with the prior studies, I find that participants who scheduled to watch the video 
rated it as less fun/more like work (M = 5.24) than those who watched it impromptu (M = 5.64, 
t(136) = 2.04, p < .05; the model includes measured controls). Those who scheduled also had 
lower consumption utility and enjoyed their chosen video less (M = 5.43) than those who 
watched it impromptu (M = 5.83, t(136) = 2.02, p < .05). Furthermore, a bootstrapped mediation 
with 5,000 samples indicated that work construal mediated consumption utility (95% CI = [.008, 
.329], see Figure 1.5 for regression results). These results are compelling because they indicate 
that even when participants are randomly assigned to schedule, scheduling makes a fun task feel 
more like work, decreasing its ultimate utility. Furthermore, this is a fairly strict test of my effect 
because the participants in the scheduled condition with the lowest predicted enjoyment would 
likely not bother to return to watch the video. One could wonder, however, whether the task 
assigned to participants was a pure leisure activity, as it was an HIT posted on MTurk. To 
address this issue, in Study 6b, I use an unambiguous leisure activity (i.e., a coffee break during 
finals) as the target activity. A further limitation of Study 6a was that half of the participants had 
to come back at a later time, whereas the other half completed the task immediately in order to 
make the impromptu condition truly impromptu. While several control variables potentially 
relevant to such selection issues were measured, in Study 6b, I keep this constant by inviting all 
participants to come back at a later time and manipulating whether the time is roughly scheduled 
(e.g., “anytime between 6:00 P.M. and 8:00 P.M.”) or specifically scheduled (e.g., 6:45 P.M.). 
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FIGURE 1.5 – STUDY 6A MEDIATION RESULTS 
 
Regression models include the following covariates: gender, employment status, whether a 
calendar is routinely kept, average HITs per week, and length of time spent watching the video 
 
1.8.2 Study 6B 
 
Method and procedure. For Study 6b, I recruited 148 undergraduate students who were 
studying for finals. I set up a stand on campus where I provided free coffee and cookies to 
students to take a break. Between 90 minutes and 30 minutes prior to setting up the stand, I 
recruited participants by handing out tickets for free coffee and a cookie to students studying 
around campus. Half of the students were asked to pick a specific time to come by and take a 
break (specifically scheduled condition) and their chosen time was written on their ticket. The 
other half were given tickets that included a two-hour redemption window (e.g., from 6:00 P.M. 
to 8:00 P.M. [roughly scheduled condition]) and were told that they could come by any time 
during this window. Thus, for both conditions, students were given a ticket in advance. Then, 
during their time window or at their scheduled time, participants came by the stand and traded in 
their ticket for a free coffee and cookie. While they were taking their study break, I handed out a 
β = -0.79** 
β = -0.04 (β = -0.20*) 
[CI: .008, .329] 
β = 0.20* 
Enjoyment 
Work 
Construal 
Scheduling 
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short survey assessing consumption utility by asking them how enjoyable they found the break (1 
= “not at all,” and 9 = “extremely”). 
Results. Of the 148 tickets distributed, 54 were redeemed, for an overall response rate of 
36.49%. Because prior research has demonstrated that setting a specific time can increase 
completion rate (Milkman et al. 2012), I overpopulated the rough scheduling condition (81 in the 
roughly scheduled condition and 67 in the specifically scheduled condition). In line with this 
prior work, there was a significantly higher redemption rate in the specifically scheduled 
condition (33 out of 67 [49.3%]) compared with the roughly scheduled condition (21 out of 81 
[25.9%]; χ2 = 8.61, p < .01).  
More importantly, and as expected, I found that students who specifically scheduled their 
break (M = 6.48) had lower consumption utility than those who roughly scheduled it (M = 7.57; 
t(52) = 2.91, p < .01). Thus, in line with the results from a hypothetical scenario in Study 3, I 
find that specifically (vs. roughly) scheduling a leisure activity by setting a specific start time 
reduced the enjoyment for a leisure activity. Importantly, in both conditions, the coffee break 
was scheduled and considered in advance; however, specifically scheduling uniquely decreased 
consumption utility.  
Note that this study suffers from a selection issue, as I was only able to survey those who 
chose to use their tickets. Although there is no reason to believe that the self-selection to utilize 
the ticket would differ systematically between the two conditions, it is possible for several 
factors (e.g., how long the students were studying before taking a break, how long after receiving 
a ticket was it before they took a break) to contribute to such an issue. Thus, I measured and 
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examined these variables. I found no significant differences. For both conditions, students had 
been studying for approximately five hours before taking the break (t < 1) and took their break 
approximately one-and-a-half hours on average after receiving their ticket (t < 1). Importantly 
though, taken in conjunction with Study 6a, I provide clear evidence that scheduling can lead 
leisure to be less enjoyable by making it feel more like work.  
1.8.3 Discussion of Studies 6a and 6b  
 
Together, Studies 6a and 6b demonstrate that the effect observed for hypothetical 
activities extends to the utility for experienced activities. I find that compared with being more 
impromptu (Study 6a) or roughly scheduling (Study 6b), participants who specifically scheduled 
the same leisure activity had lower consumption utility. While these studies together utilize 
random assignment to demonstrate that specific scheduling uniquely reduces experienced 
enjoyment, I further tested whether the negative effect of scheduling would present itself for 
those who personally chose to schedule a leisure activity. As such, 100 MTurk participants 
recalled the last movie they saw in theaters and indicated their enjoyment as well as whether they 
had specifically scheduled, roughly scheduled, or seen the movie impromptu. I find that those 
who specifically scheduled reported lower enjoyment (M = 7.12) compared with those who had 
roughly scheduled (M = 7.94; t(97) = 2.84, p < .01) or behaved impromptu (M = 8.13; t(97) = 
3.20, p < .01), who did not differ (|t(97)| < 1). Of course, these results should be interpreted only 
in conjunction with the other empirical evidence, as they are correlational in nature and open to 
several alternative explanations, but they again provide more evidence consistent with my 
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proposed effect. Taken together, my results consistently demonstrate that when consumers 
schedule their leisure, they may inadvertently reduce their utility for the activity, regardless of 
whether this scheduling is consciously chosen or incidentally applied. 
1.9 Discussion 
 
Across 13 studies, I examine how scheduling leisure activities affects the way these 
events are construed and experienced. I consistently find that scheduling a leisure activity can 
dampen anticipation and consumption utility by making it feel more like work. Study 1 
demonstrates that a leisure activity, when scheduled, takes on qualities of work. A series of six 
strategic replications (Supplemental Studies 1.1-1.6) further shows that the effect of scheduling 
leisure on work construal is robust to the busyness (vs. emptiness) of the calendar as well as 
whether the activity is recurring (vs. one time), occurring with (vs. without) externally imposed 
timetables, special (vs. mundane), initiated by a friend (vs. self), or solitary (vs. social). In Study 
2, I find support for the role of temporal structure by showing that imposing structure by 
partitioning the activity into temporal segments behaves similarly to scheduling, making even 
impromptu activities feel like work.  
In Study 3, I find that roughly scheduling a leisure activity (i.e., without setting specific 
times) does not have the dampening effect of specific scheduling. This finding supports the role 
of temporal structuring and establishes that my results are not driven by a boost from 
spontaneity. Study 4 builds on this result, showing that setting only a start time for the activity is 
enough structure to disrupt the perceived free-flow of the activity. Furthermore, Study 4 
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demonstrates that scheduling leads leisure to feel less free- flowing, which then increases work 
construal and decreases the utility for the activity. Study 5 shows that the negative effects of 
scheduling are unique to leisure activities, and do not occur for work activities.  
Finally, Studies 6a and 6b demonstrate that these effects hold for experienced activities. 
Participants had lower consumption utility following specific scheduling, such that they enjoyed 
an entertaining video (6a) and a study break (6b) less than people who did not specifically 
schedule these activities. Taken together, the studies provide consistent evidence that scheduling, 
by imposing temporal structure on otherwise free-flowing leisure activities, leads such activities 
to feel more like work and decreases their utility. My results are noteworthy, as they are the first 
to show that scheduling can have negative consequences for leisure activities. In doing so, I add 
to an increasing body of literature that shows that planning (a related concept to scheduling) is 
not uniformly beneficial and can at times undermine goal commitment (Dalton and Spiller 2012) 
and reduce self-control (Townsend and Liu 2012). My findings extend this literature by showing 
that scheduling, by imposing temporal structure, can lead leisure activities to feel more like work 
and reduce utility. 
1.9.1 Scheduling as Intertemporal Choice  
 
Resource slack. Prior research on intertemporal preferences has shown that consumers 
perceive greater slack for time in the future than in the present (Zauberman and Lynch 2005). As 
such, consumers think that they will have time in the future and willingly commit to activities, 
which they later come to regret when they realize they actually do not have the time. Thus, one 
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might wonder whether such changes in perceived time slack also underlie my demonstration of 
decreased utility due to prior scheduling. However, in the resource slack paradigm, the 
comparison is between the evaluations of the event at two points in time—when it is scheduled 
and right before it is experienced— but I am interested in comparing evaluations of the activity 
right before it is experienced and vary whether the event was specifically scheduled or not. 
Furthermore, resource slack is based on the notion that people cannot predict how busy they will 
be in the future; however, I keep this constant by providing all participants with calendars that 
hold the busyness level in the relevant time frame constant. Finally, my findings are rooted in the 
notion that leisure activities that are scheduled are construed more like work—which is not a 
relevant concern for the resource slack theory. Taken together, my findings go beyond the 
existing theorization in this domain and shed light on unique consequences of scheduling. 
Preference uncertainty. Relatedly, one could also wonder whether my findings are driven 
by uncertainty about future preferences, in line with research that demonstrates that consumers 
may be uncertain about (Simonson 1990) or mis-predict (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 
2003; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) their future consumption preferences. Thus, it is plausible 
that scheduling (vs. behaving impromptu), which at least implicitly involves prediction of future 
preferences, leaves room for such mis-prediction. I argue that the negative impact of scheduling 
leisure cannot be accounted for by mis-prediction alone. In particular, I find that with rough, 
rather than specific, scheduling, there is no detriment to consumers (Studies 3 and 6b). Both 
roughly and specifically scheduled plans are matched in their potential for realized preference 
uncertainty and/or misprediction, yet only specific scheduling (i.e., with set times) is detrimental 
 40 
 
 
 
for leisure activities. Thus, I argue that scheduling, and not merely the inability to predict future 
preferences, leads to negative downstream consequences for leisure activities. 
Savoring. Much of the prior work on anticipation utility has focused on savoring, or the 
positive utility experienced while waiting for an event (Loewenstein 1987; Loewenstein and 
Prelec 1992). In particular, Loewenstein (1987) demonstrated that consumers value delayed 
consumption of a desirable experience, presumably because anticipating the experience is 
enjoyable. I contribute to and complement this prior research by showing that the way the future 
is described might have important implications. In particular, prior work in this domain has 
described the future (planned) consumption using imprecise terminology (e.g., “in one month”), 
which is akin to my rough scheduling conditions. I find that while rough descriptions and 
impromptu activities have similarly high anticipation utility, specifically scheduling has a 
detrimental effect. These findings establish an important boundary condition to the savoring 
literature.  
1.9.2 Potential Boundary Conditions  
 
Although my primary interest has been to identify a generalized phenomenon regarding 
scheduling leisure activities, this effect is likely not universal. My studies demonstrate that this 
effect is robust to a variety of changes in the context and types of activities and to individual 
differences such as propensity to plan and trait-level reactance (reported in the Supplemental 
Studies). However, I caution against extrapolating my results to instances beyond the context I 
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studied (i.e., commonly scheduled leisure tasks that are relatively short), because other factors 
may be relevant that I did not directly test.  
Highly involved populations. How involved consumers are with their activities can vary 
across activities and situations for a given person or across individuals for a given activity 
(Havitz and Mannell 2005; Richins, Bloch, and McQuarrie 1992). In the context of scheduling, it 
is possible that consumers who are highly involved with an activity (i.e., a very avid football fan 
watching the Super Bowl) might perceive this activity as free-flowing regardless of scheduling. 
Furthermore, it is even possible for such a fan to derive positive utility in anticipation of the 
activity when it is scheduled. Studying involvement in this domain might be a fruitful avenue for 
further research.  
Populations with low opportunity cost of time. While not very common, certain 
individuals or populations (e.g., prisoners, retirees) might have very low opportunity cost of 
time. That is, their time might be characterized by almost no allocation to work or leisure 
activities. In the absence of things to do (productively or enjoyably), it is possible that a 
scheduled activity might be the source of savoring and not dread. Although this is a provocative 
prediction, such populations are rather difficult to access. As such, in this chapter, I focused on 
more general populations. Nonetheless, examination of this issue would be an interesting 
extension.  
Activities spanning multiple days. Throughout the studies, I used tasks that spanned no 
more than several hours. Thus, one may wonder whether scheduling may likewise affect longer 
tasks that span full (or multiple) days. Central to my theory is the idea that scheduling imposes 
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temporal structure through partitioning time. In the case of activities that span multiple days 
(e.g., vacations), the temporal structure added by scheduling might not be readily salient. I 
therefore conjecture that activities spanning more than a day would likely not be subject to the 
effect of scheduling, as scheduling would not temporally structure or reduce the free-flowing 
nature of such extended activities. Although this is beyond the scope of the current chapter, it is a 
worthwhile possibility for further research.  
Activities comprising multiple components. Throughout the studies, I predominately used 
activities that have a singular component (rather than multiple components, with the exception of 
Study 2). Thus, one may wonder whether scheduling individual components within an extended 
activity would show a detriment. When an activity has several components (e.g., an amusement 
park with multiple rides, a city with several tourist sites), scheduling may allow for better time 
management and may increase utility by enabling consumers to enjoy more of their desired 
activities (albeit perhaps with less enjoyment for each individual activity, as I propose). Thus, the 
net effect of scheduling may be positive because of the potential for greater efficiency or 
effectiveness in time use. This is an interesting extension, and further research could explore the 
net effect of scheduling on consumer happiness.  
1.9.3 Potential Alternative Accounts  
 
Across 13 studies, I provide consistent evidence that scheduling can lead leisure to feel 
more like work and decrease utility. In doing so, I have focused on demonstrating the robustness 
and boundaries to this effect. I use “work construal” as a broad construct that taps into how 
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effortful and chore-like an activity feels after it is scheduled. Although I am able to provide some 
evidence against certain alternative accounts, I acknowledge that the effect of scheduling on 
utility is a complex and likely multiply determined phenomenon, which poses an opportunity for 
future studies to identify additional or more specific cognitive mechanisms. Next, I discuss the 
most prominent potential alternative mechanisms.  
Reactance. Although I have suggested that scheduling leads to greater work construal and 
lessened utility for leisure activities by reducing perceived free-flow, one might wonder whether 
scheduling would also lead to reactance (Brehm 1966) by restricting personal freedom. I believe 
that reactance cannot account for my full set of results, because my effect persists when the task 
is personally planned or solitary (Supplemental Study 1.5 and 1.6), and I find that roughly 
scheduling (which also restricts future time) does not follow the same pattern as specific 
scheduling (Studies 3 and 6b). Nonetheless, to test this account more directly, I ran an additional 
study (reported briefly in Supplemental Study 1.6 as a posttest), measuring reactance using a 
subset of the Hong (1992) Psychological Reactance Scale and found that this did not moderate 
my effect. Thus, it is unlikely that reactance can fully account for my results.  
Construal. It may also be possible that scheduling increases the focus on feasibility 
concerns regarding the leisure activity, thus making it feel more work-like and less enjoyable. To 
address this possibility, I ran an additional study in which participants considered a movie with a 
friend that was either scheduled or impromptu and rated the activity on free-flow. I also 
measured concreteness of their thinking following the scheduling manipulation using the 
behavioral identification scale (Vallacher and Wegner 1989). I found that whereas scheduled 
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leisure was perceived as significantly less free-flowing (M = 4.18) than impromptu leisure (M = 
4.96; p < .05), this did not affect concreteness in thinking (Mscheduled = 7.18, Mimpromptu = 7.19; p > 
.10). As such, it is unlikely that construal would be the main driver of my results.  
1.9.4 Implications 
 
Experiential marketing. Because many leisure activities are experiential, my work also 
contributes to the growing literature on the effect of material versus experiential consumption on 
consumer happiness (Dunn, Gilbert, and Wilson 2011; Nicolao, Irwin, and Goodman 2009; Van 
Boven and Gilovich 2003). While much of this prior research has focused on the comparison 
between experiential and material purchases, I demonstrate a contextual factor— scheduling—
that can influence the utility of experiences. My findings suggest that happiness may depend not 
only on whether leisure is experienced but also on how the experiences are approached in terms 
of scheduling. Thus, it may not be enough to consider only whether to take part in positive 
experiences, such as leisure activities but also how to take part in such experiences.  
My results also have important implications for marketers, particularly in this domain. 
Experiential marketing is growing, with many firms offering full experiences (Schmitt 1999). 
For such efforts to foster enjoyable experiences to succeed in the long run, it is important for 
consumers to have favorable evaluations both in anticipation of and following consumption of 
the experiential product. My results indicate that strategies that encourage/discourage 
consumers’ scheduling behavior may affect such evaluations. That is, while programs that 
encourage consumer scheduling may increase short-term demand, it may be at the expense of 
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long-term customer satisfaction as evidenced by the decreased utility for the activity. 
Experiential marketers, therefore, may benefit from policies that encourage more impromptu 
behavior—for example, through call-ahead seating rather than advanced reservations and by 
partnering with smartphone applications (e.g., YPlan, Tablelist; Sovich 2016) that help 
accommodate last-minute consumers by connecting them with available same-day tickets and 
reservations.  
Retailing. My results have important implications for retailers. Retailers often appeal to 
customers’ desire to shop by introducing deals and sales. These promotional actions are 
generally scheduled and constrained (e.g., happy hours, sales limited to a few hours). Although 
constrained language may create a sense of scarcity, it may also have detrimental consequences 
for how enjoyable the shopping trip feels. In particular, my findings suggest that such 
specifically scheduled promotions may harm the shopping and consumption experience for 
leisure shoppers, making it feel more chore-like and less enjoyable. When aiming to maximize 
more want-based (vs. need-based) shopping, retailers may therefore benefit from using more 
rough language (e.g., “Sale all morning”).  
Consumer welfare. My results have important implications for consumer well-being, 
contributing to prior literature demonstrating how time consumption influences happiness 
(Aaker, Rudd, and Mogilner 2011; Mogilner 2010). I show that scheduling can make leisure 
activities feel more like work and can dampen the anticipation and consumption utility of such 
activities. Thus, consumers may benefit from behaving more impromptu or by only roughly 
scheduling (e.g., without specified start and end times) when faced with opportunities for leisure.  
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Managerial implications. My research has important implications for firms because it 
identifies an important way to increase both employee and customer satisfaction. In an attempt to 
promote a positive and balanced work environment, many firms organize non-work events (e.g., 
happy hours, retreats) for their employees, giving them an opportunity to bond in a relaxed 
atmosphere. These activities, however, are often scheduled (e.g., Thursday 5–8 P.M.). My work 
suggests that such an approach might backfire by making leisure engagements feel like work that 
has to be done (as opposed to something to be enjoyed). Fortunately, my research also provides a 
remedy: keep non-work engagements impromptu or roughly scheduled. For example, impromptu 
social gatherings (proverbial “water cooler discussions”) are crucial to employee satisfaction 
partly because they are not planned and are instead free-flowing. Increasing opportunities for 
employees to engage in nonscheduled leisure activities may lead to more employee engagement. 
1.10 Appendices 
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APPENDIX 1.1 – STUDENT CALENDAR USED IN STUDY 1
 
APPENDIX 1.2 – CALENDAR USED IN STUDY 2 
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APPENDIX 1.3 – STUDENT CALENDAR USED IN STUDY 3 
 
 
APPENDIX 1.4 – INSTRUCTIONS USED IN STUDY 3 
Panel A – Specific Scheduling Condition 
 
That morning (Monday), while on your way to your first class you run into a friend you’d like to catch 
up with. You discuss grabbing froyo Tuesday and agree to meet up at 4:00pm. 
 
Please add this plan to your calendar now.  
 
Panel B – Rough  Scheduling Condition 
 
That morning (Monday), while on your way to your first class you run into a friend you’d like to catch 
up with. You discuss grabbing froyo sometime Tuesday before your meeting. 
 
Please add this rough plan to your calendar now.  
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APPENDIX 1.5 – STUDENT CALENDAR USED IN STUDY 4 
 
 
APPENDIX 1.6 – INSTRUCTIONS USED IN STUDY 4 
Panel A – Start & End Scheduling Condition 
 
That morning (Monday), you see an email thread from a couple days ago. A few of your friends are 
going to get together to play frisbee on Mudd Field Wednesday from 4:30-6:30pm. You’re free at that 
time and decide to join. 
 
Please add this plan to your calendar now.  
 
Panel B – Start Time Only  Scheduling Condition 
 
That morning (Monday), you see an email thread from a couple days ago. A few of your friends are 
going to get together to play frisbee on Mudd Field Wednesday from 4:30pm onward. You’re free at 
that time and decide to join. 
 
Please add this plan to your calendar now.  
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1.11 Supplemental Studies 
 
This appendix includes full descriptions of additional analyses and studies. Supplemental 
Studies 1.1-1.6 replicate Study 1 and provide additional evidence that scheduling leads leisure 
activities to take on qualities of work while conducting robustness checks. In Study 1 
participants were shown a busy calendar and considered a one-time, everyday activity that their 
friend initiated, leaving open the possibility that the effect is limited to such circumstances. To 
help address this, Supplemental Studies 1.1-1.6 provide evidence that the effect of scheduling on 
work construal occurs when the schedule is completely free (1.1) and persists for activities that 
are recurring (1.2), occur on an externally imposed timetable (1.3), are special (1.4), are self-
planned (1.5), and are solitary (1.6).  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.1 – FREE CALENDAR 
Supplemental Study 1.1 examined whether the effect of scheduling on the work qualities 
of leisure activities would persist even when participants are given a completely free calendar. 
Importantly, it could be that perceived business drives the effect of scheduling, with schedulers 
perceiving greater business and time pressure than those in the impromptu condition. 
Furthermore, those in the scheduled condition may infer that they must be very busy indeed if 
even their leisure activities must be scheduled. Supplemental Study 1.1 provides evidence 
against this alternative by testing the robustness of the effect to alterations in the business of the 
calendar.  
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Participants and Procedure. Seventy-four MTurk participants took part in this study. All 
participants saw a completely free calendar. Those in the scheduled condition imagined that their 
friend invited them Saturday morning to an 8:00pm movie Sunday night, which they then added 
to their calendar. Those in the impromptu condition imagined that their friend invited them to a 
movie Sunday night, about half an hour prior to the 8:00pm movie. All participants then rated the 
work qualities of seeing the movie (obligation, commitment, α = .83) on 7-pt scales (1 = Not at 
all, 7 = To a great extent).  
Results. Fourteen participants were removed from the analysis for completing the study 
more than once, leaving 60 usable responses. I found the predicted effect of scheduling where 
those who scheduled construed the movie more as work (M = 4.25) than those in the impromptu 
condition (M = 3.31, t(58) = 2.15, p < .05) despite the schedule being completely free. Thus, 
Study 1B demonstrates the robustness of the effect of scheduling to the business of the calendar.  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.2 – RECURRING ACTIVITY 
Due to the one-time nature of the activities used in studies thus far, one may wonder 
whether the effect of scheduling would extend to recurring events, which may be implicitly 
scheduled (e.g., if they occur every week). In this study, participants were asked to consider an 
event that is recurring in order to test the robustness of the effect to this quality of the leisure 
activity considered. Furthermore, it could be that participants in the scheduled condition infer 
that the leisure activity is rare if it must be scheduled in order to be taken part in. Thus, this study 
helps to address this confound.  
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Participants and Procedure. One hundred and nine undergraduates took part in this 
study. The design followed very closely to that of Study 1 with one key change. All participants 
considered getting frozen yogurt with a friend, with whom they “get together over a coffee or 
snack every week.” Half of the participants then scheduled this outing on their calendar while the 
other half imagined that it occurred impromptu.  
Results. I found the predicted effect such that the activity felt more like work (chore, 
obligation, effortful, α = .73) when scheduled compare to impromptu (MScheduled = 3.64, 
MImpromptu = 3.10, t(107) = 2.16, p < .05), even when it was recurring. Thus, this study 
demonstrates that the effect of scheduling on the work construal of leisure activities extends 
beyond one-time events to recurring activities.  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.3 – ACTIVITY WITH EXTERNAL TIMETABLE 
The purpose of this study was to test the robustness of the observed effect of scheduling 
to activities with externally imposed timetables. In particular, one may wonder whether the effect 
would manifest for activities that occur on a known schedule. To address this, in Supplemental 
Study 1.3, participants evaluated an intramural volleyball game that was either scheduled or 
impromptu.  
Participants and Procedure. One hundred and thirteen undergraduate participants 
completed this study. Participants were shown a three-day calendar and asked to imagine that it 
was their actual schedule for the next few days. All participants read that they and a few friends 
had signed up for Intramural volleyball. Those in the scheduled condition were asked to imagine 
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that it was Monday morning when they saw an email from Intramural leagues reminding the 
team of their upcoming game Wednesday from 4:30-5:30pm and they decide to join in and add 
this plan to their calendar. Those in the impromptu condition imagined that it was 4:00pm 
Wednesday afternoon when they saw the email from a few days ago reminding them of their 
upcoming volleyball game, and they decide to quickly get ready and head to the game. All 
participants rated the work qualities (effortful, chore, work, α = .88) of playing volleyball as they 
were heading to the game.  
Results. I found the predicted effect such that scheduling led to greater work construal 
even with an activity that occurred on an externally imposed timetable (MScheduled = 4.11, 
MImpromptu= 3.25, t(111) = 3.24, p < .01). Thus, while Study 1 used a design in which participants 
engaged in a leisure task that was unstructured, generally lacking pre-specified times, I find in 
Supplemental Study 1.3 that the effect also occurs for activities that take place on a known 
external timetable. Despite the activity having pre-set times from an outside organization, 
individual scheduling led to greater work construal than engaging in this activity impromptu. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.4 – SPECIAL ACTIVITY 
The studies thus far have used rather mundane activities. One might wonder if I would 
obtain similar results if the event in question were more special. In particular, it is possible that 
more special events will evoke savoring (Lowenstein 1987), counteracting the effect of 
scheduling, especially considering that the savoring literature employed rather special and unique 
activities (e.g., a kiss from your favorite movie star; Loewenstien 1987; Rottenstreich and Hsee 
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2001). However, I argue that my effect is driven by specifically scheduling a leisure activity, 
regardless of its specialness. I address these issues by having participants evaluate a scheduled or 
impromptu special occasion.  
Participants and Procedure. Seventy-five MTurk participants completed this study. 
Participants were shown a two-day calendar and asked to imagine that it was their actual 
schedule for the weekend. In order to test the robustness of the effect to alterations in the 
calendar provided, this study utilized a schedule that contained only leisure activities. Those in 
the scheduled condition were asked to imagine that it was Saturday morning when their friend 
called to invite them to see a “special movie preview where the star actor and director will do a 
Q&A after the movie and be available to sign autographs” Sunday night at 8:00pm. They agree 
and imagined adding the plan to their calendar. Those in the impromptu condition imagined that 
it was Sunday evening around 7:30pm when their friend called to invite them to the special 
movie preview that night at 8:00pm. All participants rated the work qualities (obligation, chore, 
commitment, α = .83) of seeing the movie, imagining that it was Sunday night right before they 
were leaving to meet their friend.  
Results. I found the predicted effect such that scheduling led to greater work construal 
even with a special activity (MScheduled = 3.47, MImpromptu = 2.53, t(73) = 2.35, p < .05). Thus, this 
study demonstrates the robustness of the effect to further variation in both the leisure activity as 
well as the calendar provided. Despite the specialness of the event and the calendar containing 
only leisure activities, scheduled leisure took on qualities of work.  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.5 – SELF-INITIATED ACTIVITY 
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The purpose of this study was to address activities not initiated by a friend. It is possible 
that accepting an offer from a friend and scheduling this activity can increase the level of 
commitment, which in turn can account for my results. Thus, it could be that that the measure 
used to assess work construal is instead capturing felt commitment to others, with those who 
scheduled feeling greater commitment to their friend than those in the impromptu condition. 
Furthermore, activities planned by and performed with others can feel like an outside influence 
over one’s own choice and may lead consumers to feel a loss of personal control over how their 
time is spent. This perceived loss of personal control could then produce a reactive state (Brehm 
1966; Zemack‐Rugar, Fitzsimons, and Lehman 2008), accounting for my results. Thus, it is 
possible that loss of personal control could lead those in the scheduled condition to conceive the 
activity not as more work-like, but as simply more negative. Thus, it is important to establish the 
robustness of the effect to varying levels of social commitment and outside influence, providing 
evidence that work construal and not mere commitment or overall negative attributions drives 
the difference between scheduled and impromptu leisure.  
Participants and Procedure. Seventy-six MTurk participants completed this study. 
Participants were shown a two-day calendar and asked to imagine that it was their actual 
schedule for the weekend. Those in the scheduled condition imagined that it was Saturday 
morning when they invited their friend to see a movie Sunday night at 8:00pm. Their friend 
agreed and the participants imagined adding the plan to their calendar. Those in the impromptu 
condition imagined that it was Sunday evening around 7:30pm and they invited their friend to 
see a movie that night at 8:00pm. All participants rated the work qualities (obligation, chore, 
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commitment, α = .78) of the movie, imagining that it was Sunday night right before leaving to 
meet their friend.  
Results. I found the predicted effect such that scheduling led to greater work construal 
even with an activity that was personally planned (MScheduled = 4.17, MImpromptu = 3.42, t(74) = 
2.11, p < .05). Thus, while Study 1 used a design in which participants engaged in a leisure task 
that was planned by a friend, the effect of scheduling replicated despite altering this social 
component. As such, increased commitment to another individual cannot account for the results. 
These results also take a step towards ruling out reactance as an alternative account. That is, 
personally planning should also carry a sense of greater personal control over how one’s time is 
used. Nonetheless, I still find the effect of scheduling on work construal. Supplemental Study 1.6 
extends this argument further by demonstrating the effect with a solitary activity.  
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 1.6 – SOLITARY ACTIVITY 
Participants and Procedure. Seventy-nine MTurk participants took part in this study. 
Participants were shown a two-day calendar. Those in the scheduled condition imagined that it 
was Saturday morning and that they decided that it would be nice to see a movie sometime that 
weekend, picked a movie at 8:00pm Sunday night, and added the movie to their calendar. Those 
in the impromptu condition decided to go to a movie Sunday night about half an hour prior to the 
movie time. All participants rated work construal (obligation, chore, commitment, α = .87), 
imagining that it was Sunday night right before they were leaving to go to the theater.  
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Results. As predicted, those who scheduled construed the solitary activity more like work 
(M = 3.67) than in the impromptu condition (M = 2.61, t(77) = 2.57, p < .05). Thus, the effect of 
scheduling is robust to the solitary (vs. social) nature of the leisure activity. Furthermore, this 
study provides further evidence against commitment and reactance as alternative drivers of the 
effect. In particular, the effect of scheduling on work construal persists for a solitary event, 
which lacks commitment to a friend and should carry a sense of greater personal control.  
In order to provide additional evidence against reactance as an alternative explanation, a 
posttest was run in which a separate group of 80 MTurk participants rated the work construal of 
going to a movie with a friend that was either scheduled or impromptu and then completed the 
emotional response toward restricted choice and the resisting influence from others subsets of the 
Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (Hong 1992) as well as the Propensity to Plan for Time 
Short Run Scale (Lynch et al. 2010). In particular, it could be that only highly reactive 
individuals will show the effect. Alternatively, it is possible for those who do not tend to plan to 
be especially reactant to a restriction in perceived freedom. In three separate models, I find a 
significant main effect of scheduling (all ps < .05) on work construal of a hypothetical movie and 
no significant interaction of scheduling with the restricted choice subscale (F(3, 76) = 1.40, p > 
.2), the resisting influence subscale (F(3, 76) < 1), or the propensity to plan scale (F(3, 76) < 1). 
Thus, the effect of scheduling is not driven by level of reactance or whether participants 
generally plan for time. 
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Chapter 2 
When an Hour Feels Shorter: Future 
Boundary Tasks Contract the Perception and 
Consumption of Time 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Scheduling has arisen as a widely-adopted strategy to help time-pressed consumers 
organize and best use their time (Bond and Feather 1988; Kaufman-Scarborough and Lindquist 
2003). Consumers schedule by allocating time to specific tasks while leaving intervals of 
unaccounted time in between to use at their discretion (Southerton 2003). The benefits of 
scheduling individual tasks is well-established: scheduling helps consumers to prioritize tasks 
(Fernbach, Kan, and Lynch 2015), and may serve as a memory aid (Milkman et al. 2012) or 
commitment tool (Dai et al. 2012). However, how scheduling might influence the perception and 
consumption of the unaccounted time surrounding the scheduled tasks is yet to be explored. In 
this essay, I examine such intervals of time and propose that scheduling can reduce the perceived 
duration of the (unaccounted) time leading up to a scheduled task, altering the way that time is 
ultimately consumed. 
Extending the literature on attentional narrowing effects on spatial distance perception 
(Cole, Riccio, & Balcetis 2014; Wu, Ooi, and He 2004), I suggest that when a scheduled task 
occupies the endpoint of an interval, consumers’ attention narrows towards the endpoint, making 
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the endpoint loom nearer in time. As such, the interval feels subjectively shorter. Importantly, I 
propose and find that this subjective contraction of time happens above and beyond any objective 
time constraints that an upcoming task might impose (e.g., getting ready). Further, once time 
feels shorter, consumers become less willing to spend that time, particularly on relatively 
extended tasks, even when these extended tasks can feasibly be accomplished and are more 
lucrative.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Scheduling and Temporal Boundaries 
 
 At its heart, scheduling structures time. Just as significant dates divide time throughout 
the year into segments (Dai, Milkman, and Riis 2014; Peetz and Wilson 2013), scheduling 
segments the day into intervals between tasks. That is, a scheduled task divides time into two 
mental categories, one preceding the task and one following it. As such, in addition to its 
influence on individual scheduled tasks (Milkman et al. 2012; see also chapter 1), scheduling 
also creates temporal boundaries for the surrounding time. As outlined in Figure 2.1, a boundary 
can either mark the endpoint, terminating an interval of time (e.g., 10:00am-11:00am) or mark 
the beginning point, initiating an interval of time (e.g., 1:00pm-2:00pm). A given interval that 
does not border a scheduled task would be considered unbounded (e.g., 9:00am-10:00am and 
2:00pm-3:00pm).   
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FIGURE 2.1 –EXAMPLE CALENDAR 
 
While each of these time intervals are of objectively equivalent length and all have a 
specified endpoint, I suggest that the endpoint of the 10:00am-11:00am interval, which is marked 
by a scheduled task starting at 11:00am, is more salient. Building on prior research on attentional 
narrowing that established the role of physical (end)points on spatial distance perception, I 
propose that salient temporal endpoints will systematically influence duration perception.  
2.2.2 Attentional Narrowing and Time Perception  
 
Prior research on attentional narrowing within cognitive psychology established that 
increasing the visual attention paid to an (end)point in physical space shrinks the perceived 
distance between the self and that endpoint (Cole, Riccio, & Balcetis 2014; Wu, Ooi, and He 
2004). Put differently, focusing visually on a particular endpoint in space leads that location to 
feel physically closer. This prior research further shows that when consumers take a broader 
view by incorporating the environment around the particular point, distance perceptions 
Scheduled 
Task 
Bounded by 
terminating 
task 
Bounded by 
initiating task 
Unbounded 
Unbounded 
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elongate. This relationship between perceived physical distance and attentional narrowing is 
depicted visually in Figure 2.2, Panel A. Prior work on attentional narrowing is also broadly 
consistent with research demonstrating that objects that are related to immediate goals, and are 
thus more likely to garner attention, feel physically closer in space (Balcetis and Dunning 2010). 
 
FIGURE 2.2 – ATTENTIONAL NARROWING AND PERCEIVED DISTANCE 
 
Based on the research demonstrating that spatial and temporal distance are perceived 
analogously (Caruso et al. 2013; Liberman & Trope 2008), I suggest that a similar process might 
underlie the effect of scheduling on time perception (see Figure 2 Panel B). That is, when 
judging the temporal distance to a particular point in time (i.e., the duration of an interval), the 
distance may feel shorter if the consumer focuses more narrowly on the endpoint (i.e., the 
scheduled task). I further posit that the presence of a boundary task might automatically draw 
attention to the endpoint of the interval, just as a salient, distinct object in one’s environment 
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draws disproportionate attention (Calvo and Nummenmaa 2008; Treisman and Gormican 1988). 
The “next in line” effect supports this notion by demonstrating that an upcoming task can draw a 
disproportionate amount of attention at the expense of the present (Brenner 1973). Putting these 
together, I predict that when a scheduled task marks the end of a time interval, greater attention 
should be drawn to the endpoint, leading the end to loom nearer in time and thus for the interval 
to feel shorter. 
A framework based on attentional narrowing allows me to make further predictions of 
moderating factors. Because attentional narrowing is forward-looking and based on the salience 
of the endpoint, tasks that bound the beginning of a time interval should not influence the 
duration judgments of that interval. Consequently, in the example above in Figure 2.1, one would 
expect the 10:00am-11:00am interval to feel shorter than both the 1:00pm-2:00pm (bounded by 
an initiating task) and 2:00pm-3:00pm (unbounded) intervals.  
 It is important to note that my examination is focused particularly on prospective 
evaluations of time, or looking forward, how long the duration of an interval feels (Kim and 
Zauberman 2013; LeBoeuf 2006; Van Boven et al. 2010). In doing so, I refer to prospective time 
perception, subjective perception, and subjective duration judgments interchangeably to mean 
how long a prospective duration of time feels. Prior research has examined two other temporal 
perspectives: retrospective time, or looking back, how long the duration of an interval feels 
(Faro, Leclerc and, Hastie 2005; Read et al. 2005; Zauberman et al. 2010), and experienced time, 
or in the moment, how quickly or slowly time seems to pass (Conti 2001; Hansen and Trope 
2013; Sackett et al. 2010). While much of the prior theorization on prospective time perception 
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has grown from literature focusing on retrospective temporal judgments (Fraisse 1984; Hornik 
1984), my framework is based on attentional narrowing, a uniquely forward-looking perceptual 
process. Additionally, while much of the prior research on prospective duration judgments 
examined estimated task completion times, or how long consumers predict a particular task will 
take them to complete (Halkjelsvik and Jørgensen 2012; Roy, Christenfeld, and McKenzie 
2005), I build a theoretical framework that allows me to study how unaccounted time intervals 
are perceived and thus ultimately consumed. Thus, I contribute to the time perception literature 
by identifying the presence and salience of boundary tasks as a unique driver of prospective time 
perception and consumption. 
2.2.3 Time Perception and Consumption 
 
As previously discussed, my framework allows me to examine time consumption, as well 
as time perception. I propose that boundary tasks will alter time consumption in two ways by 1) 
decreasing consumers’ overall willingness to spend their available time prior to the scheduled 
task and 2) altering the types of tasks that consumers choose to perform within that interval of 
time. In making these predictions, I draw from the literature that suggests that once time feels 
shorter, it also feels less sufficient (Bilgin and LeBoeuf 2010). Furthermore, once time feels 
scarce, consumers are less likely to spend time on a target task (DeVoe and Pfeffer 2001) and 
become less willing to spend time waiting (Etkin, Evangelidis, and Aaker 2015). Building on 
these findings, I suggest that because consumers feel like their time prior to a scheduled task is 
shorter, they will be overall less willing to spend this time. 
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In addition to overall willingness to spend time, I propose that scheduled boundary tasks 
will influence the types of tasks that consumers select to perform. This prediction is based on 
research demonstrating consumers’ desire to be able to complete the tasks that they start (Jhang 
and Lynch 2015; Straub and Karahanna 1998; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). That is, 
consumers are often driven to complete tasks once they are initiated. Therefore, consumers 
should be particularly reluctant to take part in tasks that they feel cannot be accomplished within 
the available time. Because bounded intervals feel shorter, it stands to reason that relatively 
extended, but objectively feasible, tasks should feel less accomplishable during such intervals. 
As such, I suggest that consumers will become more likely to forgo relatively extended (though 
feasible) tasks in favor of shorter, more easily accomplished tasks during bounded time intervals.  
I report results from nine lab and field studies testing whether intervals bounded by 
scheduled tasks feel shorter and are thus consumed differently (see Table 2.1 for a summary of 
studies). I demonstrate that bounded intervals are perceived as significantly shorter than 
unbounded intervals (Studies 1 and 2). Further, in line with the proposed role of attentional 
narrowing, whereby a future scheduled task contracts time by drawing increased attention to the 
interval endpoint, I further find that only terminating (vs. initiating) boundary tasks lead to 
temporal contraction (Study 3). Finally, I demonstrate that the presence of boundary tasks alters 
how consumers use their available time, utilizing both real, incentive-compatible and 
hypothetical behavior, in both the lab and field. My findings establish that consumers are less 
willing to use their time (Studies 4a-4c), especially forgoing relatively productive and extended 
(though feasible) tasks when time is bounded, even in the face of monetary incentives (Studies 
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5a-5c).   
TABLE 2.1 – SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 RESULTS  
Panel A: Results for Time Perception 
 Measure Bounded Unbounded 
Process 
Evidence 
Key Takeaways 
Supplementary  
Evidence 
1 
Duration 
perception 
13.76 18.27*  
Bounded intervals feel 
shorter, field evidence 
Robustness:  
Bounded intervals feel 
shorter than unbounded 
& baseline intervals 
2 
Available 
minutes 
Subjective: 39.54 
Objective: 49.32  
Subjective: 48.86** 
Objective: 50.36 
Moderator: 
subjective 
vs. objective  
Bounded intervals are 
subjectively, but not 
objectively shorter 
Robustness:  
Both desirable & 
undesirable boundary 
tasks contract time 
3 
Duration 
perception 
Terminating: 32.46 
Initiating: 38.68 
Terminating: 34.87* 
Initiating: 38.84 
Moderator: 
terminating 
vs. initiating  
Only terminating 
boundary tasks  
contract time 
 
5b 
Duration 
perception 
47.56 55.38*    
Panel B: Results for Time Consumption 
 Measure Bounded Unbounded 
Process 
Evidence 
Key Takeaways 
Supplementary  
Evidence 
4a 
Tasks 
performed, 
real behavior 
1.86 2.38**  
Fewer tasks performed 
during bounded time 
 
4b 
Choice to 
perform a 
task, real 
behavior 
56.86% 82.35%**  
Lower likelihood to 
perform a target task 
during bounded time 
 
4c 
Likelihood to 
perform a 
task 
Divisible: 4.29 
Indivisible: 5.35  
Divisible: 5.13** 
Indivisible: 5.77* 
Moderator: 
divisible vs. 
indivisible  
Lower likelihood to 
perform a target task 
during bounded time, 
esp. indivisible tasks 
Robustness:  
Lower likelihood to 
perform both desirable 
 & undesirable tasks  
5a 
Total 
consumption 
and task 
choices 
Total: 3.34 
Productive: 1.54 
Time-wasting: 1.80 
Long: 0.99 
Short: 2.35 
Total: 4.36** 
Productive: 2.34** 
Time-wasting: 2.02 
Long: 1.84 ** 
Short: 2.52 
 
Fewer productive and 
extended tasks chosen 
during bounded time 
Replication:  
Lower likelihood to 
perform extended,  
but not short, tasks  
5b 
Choice of 
longer over 
shorter task 
78.00% 91.00%** 
Mediator: 
duration 
perception 
Lower choice of 
extended, lucrative tasks 
during bounded time 
 
5c 
Choice of 
longer over 
shorter task, 
real behavior 
80.23% 88.39%*  
Lower choice of 
extended, lucrative tasks 
during bounded time 
 
*p < .05 
**p < .01; Significance reported compared to bounded condition 
 
2.3 Study 1: Bounded vs. Unbounded Intervals 
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 The purpose of Study 1 was to provide initial evidence that scheduled boundary tasks 
lead the preceding time to feel shorter. I predicted that participants who had a future scheduled 
event would perceive the same amount of time preceding the event as significantly shorter than 
those who did not have a scheduled future event and tested this with a correlational field study.  
2.3.1 Method and Procedure 
 
Sixty three attendees at a conference took part in this two-cell (interval: bounded vs. 
unbounded) correlational design. As part of the conference agenda, there was a break occurring 
from about 4:00pm until 4:45pm, with a presidential address taking place at 4:45pm.  
Participants were stopped and asked to complete a short survey. They first indicated whether 
they were planning to attend the presidential address at 4:45pm (yes, no, maybe). Next, 
participants indicated time perception (“How long do you consider the duration between now 
and 4:45pm?”) on a 50-point subjective scale (1 = very little time, 50 = a lot of time; see 
Appendix 2.1 for exact instructions). Note that prior research has used a variety of anchors and 
scales to elicit subjective duration estimates that have been shown to be highly correlated 
(Zauberman et al. 2009). I adopted this commonly used measure of subjective perception. 
Finally, because participants were surveyed over a period of time, the time when the 
survey was taken was recorded and used as a control variable in the analysis. Note that current 
time was used as a statistical control only in this study as it varied between participants. In future 
studies, objective time is carefully controlled, eliminating the need for this statistical control 
variable. 
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2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
 Of the 63 participants, 39 (61.9%) indicated that they planned to attend the presidential 
address and were thus classified as having a bounded interval. The remaining participants who 
indicated that they definitely were not (8, 12.7%) or were maybe planning to attend (16, 25.4%) 
and who had thus not specifically scheduled the event were combined and were classified as not 
having a bounded interval. As predicted, those who considered this interval to be bounded rated 
it as significantly shorter (M = 13.76) than those who considered it to be unbounded (M = 18.27, 
t(62) = 2.04, p < .05). My statistical control of current time showed the expected effect whereby 
those who were surveyed further from the scheduled task indeed perceived that they had more 
time than those who were surveyed closer to the scheduled task (t(62) = 2.69, p < .01). This 
study provides initial evidence in the field that bounded intervals feel subjectively contracted. 
However, due to the correlational nature of the design, it could be that those who planned to 
attend the upcoming event actually had objectively less time. I address this issue next by 
manipulating, rather than measuring, boundary tasks, and by examining both subjective and 
objective duration estimates.  
2.4 Study 2: Subjective vs. Objective Time Estimation 
 
In Study 2, I sought to demonstrate that the effect of boundary tasks is driven by 
subjective rather than objective differences between bounded and unbounded intervals. As such, 
I directly measure both objective and subjective time estimates in order to demonstrate that 
boundary tasks lead time to feel subjectively contracted but do not influence judgments of 
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objective time.   
2.4.1 Method and Procedure 
 
One hundred ninety-eight MTurk participants took part in this 2 (Interval: bounded vs. 
unbounded; between subjects) x 2 (Estimate: objective vs. subjective; within subjects) mixed 
design. In the bounded condition, participants imagined that it was 7:00pm on a weeknight and 
their friend was coming over at 8:00pm. In order to emphasize that this hour was truly and 
objectively available to them, they also read that “you are all ready for your friend to come by.” 
Participants in the unbounded condition instead imagined that it was 7:00pm on a weeknight but 
that they did not have any plans for the evening and thus lacked any future boundary task. To 
provide a strict, direct test that the effect of boundary tasks reflects subjective rather than 
objective differences in available time, participants in this study were asked to estimate the 
number of available minutes, rather than the duration, of the interval. If consumers indeed 
perceive objective differences (real or inferred) between bounded and unbounded time, perhaps 
because bounded intervals prompt a need to get ready for the upcoming scheduled task, then 
participants should estimate that there are objectively fewer available minutes for actual use in 
bounded intervals. If instead the effect is driven by subjective perception, then such an objective 
measure should not differ between bounded and unbounded intervals. To that end, following the 
boundary manipulation, all participants imagined that they decided to read a book during the 
next hour and indicated both the objective number of minutes they could spend reading 
(“Objectively, how many minutes could you spend reading your book during the next hour?”) as 
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well as the subjective number of minutes they felt like they could spend reading (“Subjectively, 
how many minutes do you feel like you can spend reading your book during the next hour?”; 
adapted from Cheng and Cryder 2016). The order of the objective and subjective measures was 
counterbalanced. I expected to observe a difference in the subjective, but not in the objective 
time measure.  
2.4.2 Results 
 
A mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of boundary (F(1, 196) = 10.77, p < 
.01) such that overall, participants estimated fewer available minutes to read during the bounded 
interval (M = 44.20) than during the unbounded interval (M = 49.84). The main effect of 
measure type was also significant (F(1, 196) = 24.81, p < .01), such that overall, subjective 
estimates (M = 44.43) were lower than objective estimates (M = 49.61). Importantly, these main 
effects were qualified by the predicted interaction (F(1, 196) = 15.85, p < .01; see Figure 2.3). 
Replicating the results of Study 1, I find that participants in the bounded condition subjectively 
felt that they could spend significantly fewer minutes reading (M = 39.54) than those in the 
unbounded condition (M = 48.86, t(196) = 5.23, p < .01). Importantly, when providing an 
objective estimate, participants in both the bounded (M = 49.32) and unbounded conditions (M = 
50.36, |t(196)| < 1) indicated that they had a statistically equivalent number of minutes available 
to read their book during the next hour. Put differently, while participants in both the bounded 
and unbounded conditions estimated that they had objectively the same amount of time, those in 
the bounded condition subjectively felt they had less time to read their book. Importantly, in the 
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bounded condition, subjective estimates of time were significantly lower than the objective 
estimates (t(196) = 6.34, p < .01). However, this was not the case in the unbounded condition 
(|t(196)| < 1), indicating that participants in the bounded condition recognized that they had 
objectively more time than they subjectively felt. It is important to note that in both conditions, 
participants estimated that they had objectively less than 60 minutes. That is, it appears that in 
both the bounded and unbounded intervals, participants leave a window of time, perhaps to use if 
needed to transition into the next interval. However, subjective time perception for the bounded 
interval was shorter above and beyond objective estimates of time. The results provide direct 
evidence that bounded intervals are subjectively rather than objectively contracted. 
FIGURE 2.3—STUDY 2 RESULTS
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
 
 Study 2 demonstrates that the effect of boundaries is driven by subjective rather than 
objective differences in perceived time, providing direct evidence against the alternative account 
that objective differences, whether real or inferred, between bounded and unbounded intervals 
drive the observed effect of time perception. While participants recognize that they have 
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objectively equivalent time during bounded and unbounded intervals, bounded intervals feel 
subjectively contracted.  
This study also provides evidence for the direction of the effect, establishing that 
bounded intervals feel contracted rather than unbounded intervals feeling expanded. In 
particular, if unbounded intervals felt expanded, then one would expect subjective estimates of 
available time to exceed objective estimates. However, I find no differences between objective 
and subjective time estimates for the unbounded interval. Providing further evidence that the 
observed effect is driven by temporal contraction, I find in an additional study (Supplemental 
Study 2.1) that a bounded hour feels significantly shorter than both an unbounded and an average 
baseline hour, where the latter two did not differ. Taken together, the results thus far provide 
consistent evidence that bounded intervals are subjectively contracted. 
I propose that this temporal contraction is driven by attentional narrowing, whereby the 
greater attention focused on the endpoint of the interval leads bounded intervals to feel 
perceptually contracted. I next turn to testing the role of attentional narrowing, whereby time 
should feel shorter when the end (vs. starting) point is more salient.   
 
2.5 Study 3: Terminating vs. Initiating Boundaries 
 
 In Study 3, I sought to compare the effects of two types of boundaries on time perception: 
those that initiate and those that terminate an interval. As outlined previously, boundaries can 
either initiate (i.e., mark the beginning) or terminate (i.e., mark the end) an interval of time. I 
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predict that only boundary tasks that terminate an interval of time, and thus create a salient 
endpoint, would contract time. To test this, I manipulated the presence of a boundary task and 
whether that boundary task terminated or initiated the interval. In this study, I also sought to 
provide further evidence against the alternative explanation based on the objective time required 
to transition to future scheduled tasks. To that end, I explicitly instructed participants to consider 
transition time separately. I reasoned that once they had already accounted for time to transition 
into the next task, such considerations should no longer influence their subjective time 
perception.  
2.5.1 Method and Procedure 
 
Three hundred and one MTurk participants took part in this study that followed a 2 
(Interval: bounded vs. unbounded) x 2 (Scheduled task: terminating vs. initiating) fully within 
subjects design. Participants were provided with a hypothetical calendar (Appendix 2.2) and 
estimated the perceived duration of four one-hour long intervals in a random order. Scheduled on 
their calendar was a picnic along with an hour blocked off for transition and travel to and from 
the picnic in order to explicitly indicate to participants that they did not need to take into account 
transition time or preparation activities when providing their subjective time perception as this 
time had already been taken into account in their scheduling. Participants then indicated the 
perceived duration for two intervals (10:00am-11:00am and 11:00am-12:00pm) that preceded the 
scheduled task, where one of the intervals (11:00am-12:00pm) ended when the task began 
(terminating boundary; see Appendix 2.2). Participants also evaluated two other intervals 
 73 
 
 
 
(5:00pm-6:00pm and 6:00pm-7:00pm) that followed from the scheduled task, where one of the 
intervals (5:00pm-6:00pm) began when the scheduled task ended (initiating boundary). 
Consequently, two of the intervals (10:00am-11:00am and 6:00pm-7:00pm) were unbounded and 
two (11:00am-12:00pm and 5:00pm-6:00pm) were bounded, where one preceded and the other 
followed the scheduled task. Participants indicated how long they considered the duration of 
each of these four intervals on a 100 point subjective sliding scale (1 = Very little time, 100 = A 
lot of time). 
2.5.2 Results 
 
A fully within-subjects analysis revealed a significant main effect of boundary task (F(1, 
300) = 20.42 , p < .01) such that overall, the intervals preceding a terminating boundary (M = 
33.66) were perceived as significantly shorter than the intervals following from an initiating 
boundary (M = 38.76). There was also a marginal main effect of time interval (F(1, 300) = 3.24, 
p = .07) such that the bounded intervals (M = 35.57) were perceived as shorter than the 
unbounded intervals (M = 36.85). These main effects were qualified by the predicted (marginal) 
interaction (F(1, 300) = 3.50, p = .06; see Figure 2.4). In particular, replicating the results of 
previous studies, prior to a terminating boundary, the bounded interval felt significantly shorter 
(M = 32.46) than the unbounded interval (M = 34.87, t(300) = 2.26, p < .05). However, 
following from an initiating boundary, I no longer find a difference between the bounded (M = 
38.68) and unbounded (38.84, |t(300)| < 1) intervals. Thus, I find that bounded intervals only feel 
subjectively contracted when the boundary task terminates, or marks the end, rather than 
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initiates, or marks the beginning of, the interval.  
Note that I find a strong main effect of boundary task, where the interval that 
immediately preceded it (i.e., bounded; 11:00am-12:00pm; t(300) = 4.24, p < .001) and the 
interval before that (i.e., unbounded; 10:00am-11:00am; t(300) = 3.76, p < .001) were both 
perceived as significantly shorter than their counterparts that followed from the scheduled task. 
That is, I find that the effect of a boundary task extends beyond the interval it directly bounds to 
the preceding unbounded interval. This type of gradient, whereby intervals of time become 
increasingly contracted as they near the scheduled task is in line with my proposed framework. 
In particular, the visual funnel analogy that represents attentional narrowing implies that even if 
the task does not mark the exact endpoint but still looms in the future, it would draw attention, 
albeit to a lesser extent. Therefore, such a task should still exert influence over duration 
perception. As such, the finding that intervals of time feel increasingly contracted as they 
approach a boundary task provides further evidence in support of the role of attentional 
narrowing. 
FIGURE 2.4—STUDY 3 RESULTS 
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2.5.3 Discussion 
 
Consistent with my conceptual framework, I find in Study 3 that only boundary tasks that 
mark a salient endpoint (vs. beginning) to an interval, and thus draw attentional focus to the 
interval endpoint, contract time. Further, in this study I find temporal contraction leading up to a 
boundary task even when transition time is explicitly taken into account, providing additional 
evidence that the possibility that boundary tasks require objectively more time cannot account 
for my findings.  
Another implication of this framework is that the type of task that marks the end of an 
interval should not matter. Instead, any future boundary task should induce attentional narrowing 
on the endpoint, whether consumers are potentially savoring an upcoming desirable task or 
dreading an upcoming undesirable task. I tested this proposition in an additional study 
(Supplemental Study 2.2), in which I compared desirable and undesirable scheduled boundary 
tasks. As expected, I find that time subjectively contracts prior to both a desirable task (i.e., fun 
dinner with friends) and an undesirable task (i.e., dentist appointment), demonstrating that the 
mere presence and not the valence of the boundary task drives the effect.  
Taken together, the studies thus far provide consistent evidence that boundary tasks that 
mark the endpoint of an interval induce attentional narrowing and contract the perception of 
time. In the remaining studies, I test the influence of boundary tasks on how available time is 
consumed. I conceptualize time consumption in two ways. First, I examine consumers’ overall 
willingness to spend their time (4a-4c), and then I examine consumers’ specific task choices 
within bounded time (5a-5c). 
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2.6 Studies 4a-4c: Willingness to Spend Bounded Time 
 
The purpose of Studies 4a-4c was to examine consumers’ overall willingness to spend 
their time as a function of boundary tasks. In particular, I predict that consumers will engage in 
fewer tasks (4a), be less willing to volunteer for a task (4b), and be less likely to take part in a 
target activity (4c) during bounded time. I examined these predictions using both real (4a and 
4B) and hypothetical (4c) outcomes, both in the lab (4a and 4c) and in the field (4b). 
2.6.1 Study 4a 
 
 In Study 4a, I sought to demonstrate that consumers perform fewer tasks during bounded 
intervals of time, and did so by examining real behavior. Participants in this study were given an 
interval of free time to use as they wanted. Further testing the role of the salient endpoint as the 
driver of the effect, in this study I kept the presence of a boundary task constant, but manipulated 
the salience of the task. I predicted that participants would perform fewer tasks during their 
available time when it was saliently bounded. 
Method and procedure. One hundred fifty eight undergraduates took part in this two-cell 
(boundary task: salient vs. not salient) between-subjects study as part of a larger session. In 
particular, participants were brought into the lab to complete several unrelated studies in a half 
hour session. At the start of the session, the experimenter (who was blind to hypotheses) told 
participants that the study sessions had been running faster than expected, so she would wait a 
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few minutes to see if more participants arrived. In the boundary-not-salient condition, 
participants were told that they had “about 5 minutes to do whatever you want.” Participants in 
the salient-boundary condition were instead told that they had “about 5 minutes before we will 
get started. You can do whatever you want up until I tell you it is time to start.” Thus, in both 
conditions, participants had an upcoming task (i.e., starting the session), but this boundary task 
was made more or less salient to them. After the allotted time had passed, participants were 
asked to write down all of the things that they had done during the five minute interval. 
Qualitatively examining the responses, I found that participants performed various short 
activities within the time, such as checking their email, sending a text message, and visiting 
social media sites. Because there are only a limited number of tasks that can be performed in this 
short (5 minute) time interval, I focused on the number of tasks (rather than the types of tasks, 
which I examine in Studies 5a-5c) as the primary measure of time consumption. As such, the 
number of tasks participants performed were counted and served as the dependent measure. I 
predicted that participants in the salient-boundary condition would do fewer tasks during the 
available time than participants in the not-salient condition. 
Results and discussion. I found that participants in the salient-boundary condition did 
fewer activities during the available time (M = 1.86) than those in the not-salient condition (M = 
2.38, t(116) = 2.62), p = .01). Thus, examining actual behavior, where all participants had an 
upcoming boundary task (i.e., starting the session), I find that making that boundary task more 
salient led participants to perform fewer tasks within their available time. This study provides 
initial evidence that salient boundary tasks lead consumers to use less of their available time 
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while examining real behavior. While compelling, I sought to build on this evidence in Studies 
4b and 4c by utilizing a different operationalization of willingness to spend time. As such, I next 
examine consumers’ willingness to actually perform a particular task in a field study (4b) and 
likelihood to perform a target task in a controlled lab design (4c).  
2.6.2 Study 4b 
 
Method and procedure. One hundred and two participants were recruited at an airport to 
volunteer to help a graduate student. Participants were approached while sitting at their gate for 
this 2-cell (bounded vs. unbounded) measured design. Participants were asked whether they 
would be willing to help a doctoral student by participating in a 15-minute study for her 
dissertation during the next half hour. All participants were informed that if they agreed, the 
survey must be completed within the next half hour. Passengers located at their boarding gate 
(thus not needing additional time to get to their gate) were either approached half an hour prior to 
their boarding time (bounded) or one hour prior to their boarding time (unbounded) and were 
asked whether they would volunteer to help a doctoral student during the next half hour. Thus, 
their boarding time served as the boundary task. To confirm that participants were appropriately 
classified as bounded or unbounded, they all indicated their flight boarding time, independent of 
their agreement to participate in the 15-minute study. Those who agreed to volunteer were then 
given and completed the 15-minute paper-and-pen study. Thus, the decision was incentive-
compatible and required an actual commitment of time. I predicted that bounded participants 
would be significantly less likely than unbounded participants to volunteer 15 minutes of their 
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time, despite having objectively sufficient time to do so. 
Results and discussion. Of the 102 participants recruited, 51 participants were bounded 
and 51 were unbounded. As predicted, those participants recruited during a bounded half hour 
were significantly less likely to volunteer to help a doctoral student (56.86%, 29/51) than 
participants recruited during an unbounded half hour (82.35%, 42/51, χ2 = 7.83, p < .01). In sum, 
utilizing a correlational field design with real behavior, I find further evidence that consumers 
are less willing to spend their available time once it is bounded.  
Utilizing actual behavior, Studies 4a and 4b used very different types and lengths of 
tasks, but produced consistent results. In particular, while Study 4a examined the number of 
short and easy-to-accomplish tasks that participants engaged in, Study 4b used a target task that 
was relatively long, requiring participants to commit half of their available time (i.e., 15 minutes) 
to a single task. While I predicted and found that consumers are overall less willing to spend 
their time once it is bounded, I further predict that such an effect should be particularly 
pronounced for tasks that feel relatively infeasible to accomplish. That is, consumers’ reluctance 
to start a task that they may not be able to complete (Jhang and Lynch 2015; Straub and 
Karahanna 1998; Webster and Kruglanski 1994) should also play into their willingness to spend 
their time. Thus, in Study 4c I explicitly compare a task that is relatively indivisible (i.e., 
generally completed within one sitting) with one that is relatively divisible (i.e., commonly 
completed in multiple sittings). Based on research showing that time scarcity leads to an overall 
unwillingness to spend time (DeVoe and Pfeffer 2001, Etkin, Evangelidis, and Aaker 2015), I 
predicted that consumers would be overall less willing to engage in both types of tasks during 
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bounded time, but that this difference would be even greater for the relatively indivisible task, 
because consumers should feel particularly compelled to complete this task once they initiate it. 
2.6.3 Study 4c  
 
Method and procedure. Six hundred Mturk participants took part in this 2 (Interval: 
bounded vs. unbounded) x 2 (Task: divisible vs. indivisible) between-subjects design. 
Participants in the bounded condition imagined that it was 6:00pm on a weeknight, and that their 
friend was coming over at 9:00pm. Similarly to Study 2, they were also told that they were all 
ready for their friend to come by. Those in the unbounded condition instead imagined that it was 
6:00pm on a weeknight but that they did not have any plans for the evening. I next manipulated 
divisibility of the target task by telling half the participants (divisible condition) that they “have 
three episodes left of a TV show that you have been binge watching. Each episode is 55 minutes 
long (total of 2 hours and 45 minutes).” Participants in this condition then indicated how likely 
they would be to watch this TV show during the time from 6:00pm to 9:00pm (1 = Very 
Unlikely, 7 = Very Likely). The number of episodes was not specified. Instead, they were simply 
asked how likely they would be to watch the show, and following this question, participants 
indicated the number of episodes (out of three) that they would watch if they were to watch the 
TV show during that time. Thus, for the TV show, I have two measures of consumption: 1) 
likelihood to watch and 2) amount of the show they would watch. Participants in the indivisible 
task condition instead read that “there is a movie that you have been meaning to watch that is 2 
hours and 45 minutes long,” and indicated how likely they would be to watch this movie during 
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the time from 6:00pm to 9:00pm on the same seven-point scale. Thus, the total time required to 
watch all three episodes of the TV show was equivalent to watching the full movie. However, 
while the TV show is easily divided into three parts, making it easy to view in multiple sittings, 
the movie is harder to divide and would generally be viewed all at once. I predicted that 
participants would be overall less willing to spend their time on both tasks once time was 
bounded, but that this effect would be particularly strong for the indivisible task. Further, while 
consumers may be more willing to take part in a divisible task, I predicted that bounded 
individuals would watch fewer episodes, because time feels shorter. 
Results and discussion. I found a significant main effect of boundaries (F(1, 596) = 
24.88, p < .001) such that overall, participants were less likely to perform either task when time 
was bounded (M = 4.82) compared to when it was unbounded (M = 5.45). I further found a 
significant main effect of task type (F(1, 596) = 45.52, p < .001) such that participants were 
overall more likely to take part in the divisible task (M = 5.56) than the indivisible task (M = 
4.71). These main effects were qualified by a marginally significant interaction (F(1, 596) = 
2.73, p = .099; see Figure 2.5) indicating that the size of the difference between the bounded and 
unbounded conditions varied somewhat based on the type of target task. In particular, I find that 
while participants in both the divisible and indivisible conditions were less likely to engage in 
the target task during bounded than unbounded time, the effect was larger for the indivisible task  
(MBounded = 4.29, MUnbounded = 5.13, t(596) = 4.69, p < .001) than for the divisible task (MBounded = 
5.35, MUnbounded = 5.77, t(596) = 2.36, p = .02).  
Finally, those participants in the divisible task conditions also indicated the number of 
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TV episodes (out of three) that they would watch during that time. Looking at this measure, I 
found that those in the bounded condition would watch fewer episodes (M = 2.04) than those in 
the unbounded condition (M = 2.24, t(297) = 2.18, p = .03). Examining this measure further, I 
found that participants in both conditions were similarly likely to choose to watch one episode 
(Bounded = 28.87%, Unbounded = 26.75%, χ2 < 1), but that participants in the bounded 
condition were significantly more likely to watch two episodes (Bounded = 38.73%, Unbounded 
= 22.29%, χ2 = 9.58, p < .01) and significantly less likely to watch all three episodes (Bounded = 
32.39%, Unbounded = 50.96%, χ2 = 10.54, p < .01). Thus, although there was adequate time to 
watch all three episodes in both conditions, participants in the bounded condition chose to watch 
fewer episodes. In sum, I find an overall reduced willingness to spend time during bounded 
intervals, even on tasks that are easily divided and for which consumers would feel less 
compelled to fully complete once they had been initiated.  
FIGURE 2.5—STUDY 4C RESULTS 
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which consumers may be particularly motivated to complete once initiated due to an aversion to 
being interrupted during such tasks (Nelson and Meyvis 2008). As such, one may wonder 
whether similar effects would be found for less desirable tasks. To test this, in an additional 
study (Supplemental Study 2.3), I explicitly compared desirable and undesirable target tasks, 
finding that participants are less likely to engage in both desirable leisure (i.e., TV episode) and 
undesirable work tasks (i.e., online training) that are relatively long but feasible to accomplish 
within an amount of bounded time. Taken together, my results support the notion that overall, 
consumers are less willing to spend their available time on desirable or undesirable target tasks 
as both tasks would feel more difficult to complete within bounded time.  
2.6.4 Discussion of Studies 4a-4c 
 
Taken together, Studies 4a-4c demonstrate that consumers become less willing to 
consume their available time once it is bounded by a scheduled task. Examining both real and 
hypothetical outcomes in both the lab (4a and 4c) and field (4b), I find that participants perform 
fewer tasks (4a) and are less willing to perform a target task (4b and 4c) during bounded 
compared to unbounded time. It is important to note that the effect of boundedness is found to be 
exaggerated for tasks that are less divisible, relatively extended, and for which consumers would 
be likely to want to complete once initiated. In Studies 5a-5c I build on these findings and 
systematically examine consumers’ choice of tasks to perform during bounded time. 
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2.7 Studies 5a-5c: Task Choices within Bounded Time 
 
 Having examined consumers’ willingness to spend their available time, I next turn to 
examining the types of tasks that they choose to engage in once time is bounded. I predicted that 
upcoming scheduled tasks would not only reduce consumers’ overall willingness to spend their 
time, but would also alter the tasks they choose to consume within that time. That is, participants 
will forgo relatively productive and extended tasks during bounded time because time may feel 
insufficient for accomplishing such tasks. To that end, I examine the choice of tasks based on 
their productivity (5a) and length (5a-5c), demonstrating that consumers choose to forgo 
relatively productive and extended (though feasible) tasks during bounded time even in the face 
of actual financial incentives (5c). In doing so, I examine both hypothetical (5a and 5b) and real, 
incentive-compatible choices (5c).  
2.7.1 Study 5a 
 
Method and procedure. One hundred seventy four MTurk participants took part in this 2-
cell (bounded vs. unbounded) study. Participants in the bounded condition read that it was 
7:00pm on a Wednesday and that they were leaving to meet a friend at 8:00pm. I included the 
statement, “you are dressed and ready, and have an hour before you will leave to meet your 
friend” in order to emphasize that this time was truly available to them. Participants in the 
unbounded condition instead read that it was 7:00pm on a Wednesday but that they did not have 
any plans for the evening. All participants were then given a list of 14 items (e.g., read a book, 
do work, surf the internet), as well as a fifteenth “other” option and were asked to check all the 
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activities that they would be likely to actually do during the next hour (from 7:00pm-8:00pm). In 
order to examine the types of tasks participants would choose to do, participants rated all of the 
tasks in terms of productivity (1 = more time-wasting, 7 = more productive) and relative length 
(1 = relatively short, 7 = relatively long). I intended to use these two scales as a means of 
classifying tasks as relatively productive versus relatively time-wasting and as relatively long 
versus relatively short. I accomplished this by classifying the tasks with mean productivity 
ratings above the scale midpoint as relatively productive and those with means below the 
midpoint as relatively time-wasting. Similarly, those tasks with a mean length above the scale 
midpoint were classified as relatively long, while those with means below the midpoint were 
classified as relatively short. Examining the two boundary conditions separately led to the same 
classification assignments for all tasks. That is, participants across conditions agreed on which 
tasks were relatively productive/time-wasting and which tasks were relatively long/short.  
 Results and discussion. Looking first at the total number of selected tasks, I replicate the 
results of Study 4A, finding that overall, participants in the bounded condition would do 
significantly fewer activities (M = 3.34) than those in the unbounded condition (M = 4.36, t(172) 
= 2.92, p < .01). Next, I examined the types of tasks that participants selected. I found that those 
in the bounded condition selected significantly fewer of the productive tasks (MBounded = 1.54, 
MUnbounded = 2.34, t(172) = 2.87, p < .01), but just as many of the relatively time-wasting 
activities (MBounded = 1.80, MUnbounded = 2.02, t(172) = 1.50, p > .10). Further, those in the 
bounded condition selected significantly fewer of the relatively long tasks (MBounded = 0.99, 
MUnbounded = 1.84, t(172) = 4.25, p < .01), but just as many of the relatively short tasks (MBounded 
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= 2.35, MUnbounded = 2.52, |t(172)| < 1). Thus, during bounded time, participants felt that they 
could do less with their available time, reducing the selection of relatively productive and 
extended tasks. 
These results imply that consumers should be less likely to engage in lengthier, but not 
shorter, tasks when their time is bounded. I tested this notion in an additional study where I 
manipulated task length directly (Supplemental Study 2.4). As expected, I find that consumers 
are indeed less likely to engage in a relatively extended task (i.e., read a few chapters of a book), 
but just as likely to engage in a relatively short task (i.e., read a few pages) during bounded time. 
Thus far, I have found that consumers overall do less and become less likely to engage in 
relatively extended and productive tasks during intervals of bounded time. I next sought to test 
whether this aversion to performing relatively extended (though feasible) tasks during bounded 
time might occur even in the face of incentives to take on a longer task. To that end, I presented 
participants with the choice of an extended task with a higher average rate of pay, or a shorter 
task with a lower rate of pay, using both hypothetical (5b) and real outcomes (5c). I predicted 
that participants in the bounded condition would be less likely to select the higher pay task 
despite having objectively enough time to complete this option. 
2.7.2 Study 5b 
 
The purpose of Study 5b was to examine whether consumers would be less likely to 
choose a longer (though feasible) task within bounded time, even in the face of financial 
incentives. I further sought to test the mediating role of time perception, whereby the perception 
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that bounded time is shorter drives the reduced choice of relatively long tasks. 
 Method and procedure. Two hundred MTurk participants took part in this 2-cell 
(bounded vs. unbounded) study. Participants imagined that it was 7:00pm on a weeknight and 
their friend was coming over at 8:00pm (bounded) or that they did not have any plans for the 
evening (unbounded). Participants in the bounded condition also read that “you are all ready for 
your friend to come by” to emphasize that the time was truly available. MTurkers imagined that 
during the next hour, they decided to do a survey on MTurk and chose between a 30 minute task 
that pays $2.50 (i.e., $5.00/hour) and a 45 minute task that pays $5.00 (i.e., $6.67/hour). 
Following this choice, participants were asked to indicate the perceived duration of the next hour 
on a 100 point sliding scale (1 = very short, 100 = very long). 
 Results and discussion. Looking first at task choice, I find the predicted effect of 
boundaries, whereby significantly fewer participants in the bounded condition (78/100) selected 
the 45 minute task with a higher average rate of pay compared to the unbounded condition 
(91/100, χ2 = 6.45, p = .01). Thus, participants in the bounded condition became less likely to 
choose the longer, financially superior option, despite having objectively sufficient time to 
complete this task. Note that in Study 2, using the exact same manipulation of boundedness, 
participants indicated that during both a bounded and an unbounded hour they could objectively 
perform a task for about 50 minutes. Even considering 50 minutes (rather than the full one hour) 
as the benchmark, participants in the bounded condition became less likely to perform a lucrative 
45 minute task for which they had objectively sufficient time.  
 I next examined subjective time perception. Replicating my previous results, I found that 
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the bounded hour (M = 47.56) felt significantly shorter than the unbounded hour (M = 55.38, 
t(198) = 2.16, p < .05). Furthermore, I tested whether changes in survey choice operated through 
subjective time perception using a bootstrapped mediation with 5000 samples (see Figure 2.6 for 
full regression results). Condition was dummy coded such that unbounded = 0 and bounded = 1. 
I found a significant indirect effect of boundedness on task choice, operating through time 
perception (95% [CI] = -.454, -.019). Thus, bounded time felt subjectively contracted, reducing 
the likelihood of engaging in the relatively long, but objectively feasible, more lucrative task 
option. Next, in Study 5c, I sought to replicate this effect on task choice while examining real 
behavior in an incentive-compatible design. 
FIGURE 2.6—STUDY 5B MEDIATION RESUTLS 
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survey to actually complete during either a bounded or unbounded hour during their day. 
Participants in this study were also provided with the option to not perform either survey. I 
predicted that bounded participants would be less likely to choose the 45 minute survey even in 
the face of financial incentives. 
 Method and procedure. Three hundred fifty two MTurkers participated in this 2 (bounded 
vs. unbounded) between subjects design. Participants were recruited for an “academic study 
about scheduling behavior” that was described as targeting “workers who regularly schedule and 
use an electronic calendar.” I recruited participants on this basis because all participants were 
asked to provide their schedule for the following day, and I wanted to ensure that they would be 
more likely to have 1) at least one scheduled task and 2) their calendars on hand to be able to 
accurately provide their schedules for the following day. All participants were first presented 
with a calendar for the day divided into half hour time slots starting from 8:00am and extending 
to 10:00pm and were asked to fill in the time slots with all of their scheduled tasks for the 
following day (see Appendix 2.3 Panel A for exact instructions). Next, in order to be able to 
control for transition time for those participants assigned to the bounded condition, for each 
scheduled activity, participants were asked to indicate 1) the exact start time for each of their 
scheduled tasks and 2) the time that they would start any preparations or transition for their 
scheduled tasks (see Appendix 2.3 Panel B for exact instructions). Transition time was calculated 
by subtracting the time they would start preparing for the task from the task’s start time. I 
collected this measure in order to eliminate any participants assigned to the bounded condition 
who needed too much transition time in order to objectively be able to complete the longer task. 
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That is, I intended to only include those participants who had objectively sufficient time to 
participate in either task (described in detail below). Participants then answered a series of filler 
demographic questions (time zone, state of residence, age, gender, etc.) in order to create a short 
distraction task between filling out their calendar and the dependent measure (choice of a task to 
perform at a certain point in time) in order to reduce possible demand effects. 
After these demographic questions, participants were thanked for their participation and 
presented with the choice to perform an additional MTurk survey the following day if they 
qualified. In particular, participants were told that I was recruiting participants for two additional 
academic studies: 1) a 30 minute brief version of the study for $2.50 and 2) the 45 minute full 
study for $5.00. They were also presented with a third option to not sign up for either study. 
They further read that the studies would only run for a limited time and were presented with a 
specific hour (e.g., 9:30am-10:30am) during which the study would need to be completed (see 
Appendix 2.4 for exact instructions). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions where 
those in the bounded condition were shown a target hour that ended in a scheduled task from 
their own calendar (e.g., they would be assigned 9:30am-10:30am if they had a scheduled task 
starting at 10:30am, but had 9:30am-10:00am and 10:00am-10:30am free). Those in the 
unbounded condition were instead shown a target hour to complete the additional study that was 
separate from any of their scheduled tasks by at least half an hour (e.g., they would be assigned 
9:30am-10:30am if they had 9:30am-10:00am, 10:00am-10:30am, and 10:30am-11:00am all 
free). Participants then indicated which task they would like to complete during that bounded or 
unbounded hour if they qualified (30 minute study, 45 minute study, or neither study). Due to 
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budget constraints, I emailed ten percent of participants the next day with a link to the task of 
their choice to be completed during their target hour, and these selected participants were paid 
accordingly upon completion. The remainder of the participants were informed that that they did 
not qualify and thus their chosen study was not available to them. Thus, their choice had real 
outcomes. Finally, participants indicated whether they had other plans that had to be performed 
within the bounded or unbounded hour they were presented. I collected this measure in order to 
examine only those participants for whom the presented time was truly unaccounted. In addition 
to this item, two other control variables were collected: (1) busyness (“How busy are you on 
average?” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely), in order to control for individual differences in 
scheduling and time consumption tendencies and (2) participants’ use of a paper or electronic 
calendar (paper, electronic, both, neither; coded as electronic or both = 1, paper or neither = 0), 
which was necessary for participants’ ability to accurately report their schedule. 
Results and discussion. Of the 352 participants recruited, 211 were assigned to the 
bounded condition and 141 were assigned to the unbounded condition. I overpopulated the 
bounded condition as I expected that it would be more difficult to find an available bounded hour 
to present them with the dependent measure. One hundred seventy one (out of 211) bounded 
participants had a free bounded hour available and were thus presented with the dependent 
measure, while 138 (out of 141) unbounded participants had an available unbounded hour and 
were presented with the dependent measure. As discussed above, I only included the participants 
who fit the following two criteria: those participants who 1) had no other tasks to do during the 
target time and 2) had sufficient time to complete either task after accounting for required 
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transition time. Of the 117 participants in the bounded condition, 31 did not qualify for the first 
criterion and 54 did not satisfy the second criterion. In the unbounded condition, 26 (out of 138) 
participants failed to satisfy the first criterion (note that the second criterion does not apply for 
this condition). The final sample thus included 86 bounded and 112 unbounded participants, all 
of whom were available during the target hour and had objectively enough time to complete 
either task they might choose (i.e., 45 minutes or 30 minutes). 
Building on Study 5b, I was interested in the likelihood of choosing the longer, 45 minute 
task with a higher average rate of pay. As such, I coded the dependent variable into a binary 
variable whereby longer task = 1, shorter task = 0, and neither = 0. Binary logistic regression 
(controlling for busyness and the use of an electronic calendar) revealed the predicted effect of 
boundedness (χ2 = 3.78, p = .05). Thus, replicating the hypothetical results of Study 5B, I find 
that those in the bounded condition (80.23%, 69/86) were less likely to select the longer, though 
feasible and lucrative task than those in the unbounded condition (88.39%, 99/112) using 
incentive-compatible outcomes.  
2.7.4 Discussion of Studies 5a-5c 
 
 Taken together, Studies 5a-5c demonstrate that consumers become less likely to choose 
relatively productive (5a) and feasible, but relatively extended tasks (5a-5c) during bounded 
time, even in the face of financial incentives (5b and 5c). Employing both hypothetical (5a and 
5b) and incentive-compatible choices (5c), I demonstrate that scheduled boundary tasks 
systematically alter the consumption of available time, leading consumers to forgo relatively 
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extended tasks in favor of shorter, more easily accomplished tasks. 
2.8 Discussion 
 
Across nine studies, I examine how intervals of unscheduled time are perceived and 
consumed as a function of boundary tasks. I consistently find that intervals bounded by 
scheduled tasks feel subjectively contracted, altering the way in which this time is ultimately 
consumed. Using a correlational field design (Study 1) and an experimental lab design (Study 2), 
I find that participants who had a future scheduled task perceived time to be shorter than those 
who did not have a scheduled task, even after accounting for differences in demands for one’s 
time. Combined with an appended study (Supplemental Study 2.1), Study 2 provides support for 
temporal contraction resulting from the presence of boundary tasks, rather than temporal 
expansion resulting from the absence of boundary tasks. Supporting my proposed attentional 
narrowing framework, I find that while both desirable and undesirable tasks show the effect 
(Supplemental Study 2.2), only terminating (vs. initiating) boundaries that mark the endpoint to 
an interval (Study 3) lead time to feel subjectively shorter.  
I further find that the temporal contraction in the bounded condition influences 
consumers’ overall willingness to spend available time (Studies 4a-4c), as well as the types of 
tasks they select to perform (Studies 5a-5c). In particular, consumers take on fewer tasks (Study 
4a) and are less likely to perform a target task (4b and 4c) during bounded (vs. unbounded) time. 
Furthermore, I find that consumers become less likely to choose relatively productive (5a) and 
extended, though feasible (5a-5c) tasks even when longer tasks are financially incentivized (5b-
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5c). Using both hypothetical and incentive-compatible designs, results of my studies identify a 
unique driver of time perception and consumption, and establish that how consumers structure 
and organize their day has important implications for how they perceive and consume their free 
time. 
2.8.1 Scheduling 
 
Prior research on scheduling demonstrated several of its benefits (for an exception, see 
chapter 1). Scheduling is associated with lower anxiety and may help time-pressed consumers 
cope with busyness (Bond and Feather 1988), increases the likelihood of completing tasks 
(Milkman et al. 2012; Tonietto and Malkoc 2016), and promotes efficiency by helping 
consumers explicitly prioritize and plan steps necessary to complete tasks (Fernbach, Kan, and 
Lynch 2015). Prior research, however, has primarily examined the effect of scheduling on the 
scheduled tasks. As such, I contribute to this literature by examining how scheduling impacts the 
perception and ultimate consumption of available time surrounding scheduled tasks.  
2.8.2 Subjective Time Perception 
 
My work contributes to the current theorization on subjective time perception by 
developing a prospective theory of time. While much of the prior theorization on prospective 
time perception has grown from literature focusing on retrospective temporal judgments (Fraisse 
1984; Hornik 1984), my framework is based on attentional narrowing, a uniquely forward-
looking perceptual process. I next discuss how my work fits into and contributes to the two 
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primary models of subjective time perception that have been developed in the literature: 
attentional and memory-based models (Block and Zakay 1997).  
 Attentional models. At their heart, attentional models of time perception propose that the 
amount of attention that consumers devote to the passing of time dictates perceived duration in 
retrospect (Block and Zakay 1997; Sackett et al. 2010). This prior research has found, for 
example, that when consumers pay less attention to the passage of time because the current task 
they are performing is difficult (Zakay, Nitzan, and Glicksohn 1983) or enjoyable (Sackett et al. 
2010), time feels as though it passed more quickly and thus the duration of the performed task is 
estimated as shorter. Importantly, such attentional models of time perception have focused 
predominately on 1) judgements of experienced time spent performing a task and 2) attention 
devoted to the unfolding of time. I contribute to this literature by examining prospective 
perception of unaccounted time and the effect of paying greater attention to the end of a unit of 
time, finding that when attention is narrowed on the endpoint, intervals of unaccounted time feel 
prospectively contracted. In doing so, I contribute to recent research showing that the type of 
task that marks the end of a unit of time can systematically impact experienced time (Maglio and 
Kwok 2016). In particular, that research found that time spent travelling toward a more 
ambiguous task feels retrospectively longer. Interestingly, it could be that a more ambiguous task 
may garner greater attention, posing an opportunity for future research to examine the potential 
differences (or similarities) between prospective and experienced temporal judgements as a 
function of attention to the interval endpoint. 
 Memory-based models. Memory-based models of subjective time perception propose that 
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perceived retrospective duration is a function of the amount of information recalled about the 
experience (Fraisse 1984; Zauberman, Levav, Diehl, and Bhargrave 2010). For example, when 
consumers recall more changes that occurred during an experience, they estimate that the 
experience was subjectively longer (Ahn, Liu, and Soman 2009; Fraisse 1984). Relatedly, when 
consumers can recall a greater number of intervening events related to a target past event, they 
perceive that target past event as having occurred longer ago (Zauberman et al. 2010). Thus, this 
research shows that enumerating recalled pieces of information tends to elongate retrospective 
temporal judgements. A similar process has also been found to underlie the prospective 
estimation of how long a task will take. In particular, enumerating the subcomponents of a 
multifaceted task leads consumers to estimate that the task will take longer to complete than if 
these subcomponents were not considered (Kruger and Evans 2004). While my research context 
focusing on the prospective perception of unaccounted time is outside of the scope of the current 
theorization of memory (or enumeration) based models of time perception, such models imply a 
potential boundary condition. In particular, such models imply that my observed effect of 
boundary tasks may not extend to intervals of accounted time, particularly if the interval is 
composed of multiple tasks or if the consumer considers the multiple components of the task. I 
discuss this potential boundary condition in greater depth in section 2.8.5. 
2.8.3 Limited Future Time Perspective 
 
Prior research within the aging and development literature examined the effect of a 
limited future time perspective on goals and behavior (Carstensen 1992; Lang and Carstensen 
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2002), demonstrating that the perception of life coming to a salient end makes people more 
focused on maintaining emotionally and socially meaningful relationships. I contribute to this 
literature by demonstrating that perceptions of limited time, even within a day, can 
systematically influence the way that time is ultimately consumed. Further research could 
examine whether boundary tasks not only alter consumption of available time, but also influence 
relevant goals and motivation within that time.  
2.8.4 Potential Alternative Accounts 
 
As with many temporal phenomena, the effect of scheduled boundary tasks on time 
perception and consumption is a complex and likely multiply determined phenomenon. While I 
provided evidence against some alternative accounts, there are a few others worth discussing.  
Savoring and dread. One potential explanation for my observed results is that consumers 
are excitedly anticipating the upcoming scheduled task, which would suggest a process operating 
through savoring (vs. dread; Loewenstein 1987). An appended study (Supplemental Study 2.2) 
helps provide evidence against such an account. In particular, I find that the time prior to both a 
negative, dreaded task (i.e., a dentist appointment) and a positive, savored task (i.e., a fun dinner 
with friends) feels similarly contracted. If time felt shorter as consumers excitedly anticipated the 
scheduled task, then one would expect the dread associated with anticipating a negative task to 
show the opposite effect (or no effect). However, I find that time subjectively contracts prior to 
both types of tasks, providing evidence against this alternative account.  
Mental readiness. Similarly, one may wonder whether a desire to be mentally ready for 
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the upcoming task (e.g., in order to get the most from the scheduled task) may play a role in my 
demonstrations. While such a concern may sometimes be relevant for consumers, this does not 
seem to be a necessary condition to my effect. In Studies 4a and 4b, I demonstrated the effect 
with relatively low involvement tasks – the beginning of an experimental session (Study 4a) and 
boarding time, with at least 15 minutes to spare (Study 4b). Mental preparation and readiness 
tend to be low in both of these situations, making it unlikely to serve as a credible alternative 
account. 
2.8.5 Potential Boundary Conditions 
 
Accounted vs. unaccounted time. I exclusively studied the contraction of intervals of 
unaccounted time. One might wonder, however, whether time periods that are accounted for 
would also show a similar contraction prior to scheduled tasks. That is, would a scheduled task 
also feel shorter if it ended in another, back-to-back scheduled task? I ran an additional study in 
order to directly test this possibility using a 2 (Interval: bounded vs. unbounded) x 2 (Time: 
accounted vs. unaccounted) fully within subjects design. Participants were provided with a 
hypothetical calendar for the day that had two meetings scheduled back-to-back. In a random 
order, they indicated their perceived duration for each of the two back-to-back meetings as well 
as the two hour-long intervals preceding the meetings. I find a significant interaction (F(1, 199) = 
7.96, p < .01), such that the bounded interval was perceived as significantly shorter (MBounded = 
24.79, MUnbounded = 29.44, t(199) = 3.33, p < .01) only when the time period was unaccounted, 
but not when accounted (MBounded = 40.49, MUnbounded = 40.56, |t(199)| < 1). This is consistent with 
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my explanation of attentional narrowing. When estimating the duration of accounted time, 
consumers are likely to focus on the task at hand rather than the task that marks the endpoint, 
preventing the boundary task from exerting influence over duration perception.   
 Longer time intervals. Throughout my studies, I have examined intervals of time of no 
more than a few hours. Thus, one may wonder whether the observed effect of boundaries might 
extend to longer intervals (e.g., a full day, weeks, or years). Central to my conceptual framework 
is the idea that a future task may draw greater attention to the interval endpoint, leading the 
endpoint to loom nearer in time. Importantly, a task may reasonably draw much less attention 
when it is far out into the future. As such, when a longer interval of time ends in a scheduled task 
(e.g., a doctor’s appointment at the end of the week), it may no longer exert influence over time 
perception for the preceding interval. Such an examination of interval length may pose a fruitful 
avenue for future research. 
Deadlines. In my studies, I consistently find that consumers are less willing to spend their 
time once it is bounded by a scheduled task. However, situations may exist where one might 
expect the opposite such that an upcoming task and the perception that time is short increases 
consumers’ motivation to perform a target task. One such instance is when the boundary task 
serves as a deadline, or when the target task must be completed prior to the start of the scheduled 
task (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). In my studies, I have examined the consumption of target 
tasks that are not directly related to the boundary task, thus not posing the need to have a task 
completed before the boundary. If, instead, the target task was something that must be completed 
prior to the scheduled task, there is reason to expect boundaries to instead increase the likelihood 
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of completing the task.  
To test this notion, I asked participants to imagine that they were taking a night class. 
They read that it was 6:00pm and that their class either met at 7:00pm that night (bounded) or the 
next night (unbounded). Half the participants also read that they needed to complete a 45-minute 
reading before class. The other half were told that the 45-minute reading was for their job, and 
was thus unrelated to the class. All participants indicated how likely they would be to complete 
the 45-minute task during the next hour (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). I found a significant 
interaction (F(1, 325) = 14.88, p < .001), such that willingness to engage in the target task 
decreased prior to an unrelated boundary task (MBounded = 4.24, MUnbounded =4.99, t(325) = 2.87, p 
< .001), but increased when the boundary task served as a deadline (MBounded = 6.03, MUnbounded = 
5.35, t(325) = 2.59, p = .01). Thus, I find that while often an upcoming task reduces willingness 
to spend the available time, this tendency is not universal and might even reverse when the 
upcoming boundary task serves as a deadline.   
Naturally occurring boundaries. An interesting avenue for future research may be to 
examine boundaries that naturally occur. For example, for some consumers, 5:00pm may be a 
natural boundary because they leave work each day at that exact time, suggesting that 
consumption of the hour from 4:00pm to 5:00pm may be different from other hours throughout 
the day. While my theory would predict no differences for naturally occurring (vs. scheduled) 
boundaries, testing of this prediction is beyond the scope of the current essay.  
2.8.6 Implications 
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Marketing implications. My results have important implications for marketers. Marketers 
are often interested in managing consumers’ time perceptions. While wanting warranty 
descriptions to feel expanded, they might desire delivery times to feel contracted. My research 
demonstrates that how the interval is described (whether bounded or unbounded) may 
systematically influence how subjectively long the interval feels, providing venues for marketers 
to manage consumers’ time perceptions.  
Additionally, many consumer experiences have multiple components, including both 
scheduled activities as well as intervals of free time (e.g., amusement parks, zoos, etc.), creating 
a need to maximize consumer satisfaction over these more complex experiences. For ticketed 
attractions, marketers want to manage the supply chain such that consumers are on time but do 
not arrive too early, which may cause congestion, bottlenecks, or confusion. In the present 
research, I find that the time leading up to a ticketed (and thus scheduled) task may feel 
contracted, potentially altering the way that consumers use that time or leading consumers to 
gather earlier than they might otherwise. As such, marketers may benefit from providing a rough 
window rather than an exact time for ticketed events within these multi-component experiences. 
Consumer welfare. My results also offer important implications for consumers looking to 
get the most from their available time, especially because how consumers perceive and spend 
their time is directly tied to happiness and well-being (Aaker, Rudd, and Mogilner 2011). 
Further, one of the reasons why consumers engage in scheduling is to maximize and expand their 
available time as well as to fit in more of their desired activities. In this chapter, I find that 
scheduling can instead lead time to feel contracted. My results therefore indicate that if the goal 
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is to maximize time perception and consumption, consumers can benefit from minimizing the 
number of temporal boundaries (e.g., through back-to-back vs. intermittent scheduling). Note 
that consumers may have many other goals for their day, such as maintaining an optimal level of 
mental resources across scheduled tasks and unaccounted time, maximizing efficiency of time 
use, etc., where scheduled tasks may serve as necessary interruptions to break up the day (Nelson 
and Meyvis 2008). Future research could work to uncover the net effect of different 
organizational strategies to inform these multiple goals. 
 
2.9 Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 2.1 – STUDY 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
Are you planning to attend the presidential address at 4:45pm? 
Yes   No  Maybe 
How long do you consider the duration between now and 4:45pm? (check a circle) 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.2 – STUDY 3 CALENDAR STIMULI 
 103 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.3 – STUDY 5C INSTRUCTIONS 
Panel A:  Calendar fill-in instructions 
 
We are interested in how people use calendars 
and organize their scheduled tasks throughout 
the day.  
  
In the calendar below, please enter all of your 
scheduled meetings and appointments for 
tomorrow. Only include those meetings and 
appointments that are specifically scheduled 
with a specific and firmly set start time (e.g., 
Dr. appointment at 3:00pm, lunch at 
12:00pm, starting work at 9:00am, meeting at 
1:30pm, etc.). 
 
Included meetings and appointments should be 
those that have a fairly strict start time and for 
which you would plan to be on time. 
 
Panel B:  Transition time instructions 
 
Q1) At what time, specifically, does each of the 
scheduled tasks you entered start? 
 
Q2) If you will have any preparation or transition 
immediately before your plans (e.g., getting dressed, 
travelling, etc.), what time will you start those 
preparations?  
  
For example, if you have plans to meet a friend at 
6:00pm, but will start getting ready to head over 
there at 5:30pm, then you would select "5:30pm" 
  
Please select the same time as above if you do not 
have any preparation or transition immediately 
before your plans (e.g., in the example, the response 
for both times would be "6:00pm") 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.4 – STUDY 5C DEPENDENT MEASURE 
Bounded 
Bounded 
Unbounded 
Unbounded 
Terminating 
Boundary  
Initiating 
Boundary  
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Thank you for completing this study! 
 
Based on your responses, you may qualify for an additional HIT. We are recruiting participants for two 
additional academic studies that will be running tomorrow (Wednesday December 21st). If you are 
interested, you can sign up for the chance to be included in one of these studies. 
 
In the additional, optional studies, we are interested in your personality, opinions, values, and behaviors. 
As such, you will be asked a series of questions about how you tend to think, feel, and behave. 
  
We are looking for participants to complete one of the two studies: 
(1) either a 30 minute brief version of the study for $2.50 
(2) or the 45 minute full study for $5.00 
  
Both of these studies will run for a limited time - from 9:30am-10:30am tomorrow - and must be 
completed within that time. If you qualify, you will receive an email alerting you when the study you 
chose is posted on MTurk tomorrow. 
  
If you qualify, would you like to sign up to participate in one of these studies from 9:30am-10:30am 
tomorrow? 
 
o 30 minute study that pays $2.50 
o 45 minute study that pays $5.00 
o Neither study 
 
 
2.10 Supplemental Studies 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 2.1 – TEMPORAL CONTRACTION VS. EXPANSION 
This study includes a baseline measure in which participants estimated the duration of an 
average hour in order to further test temporal contraction (vs. expansion). I predicted that a 
bounded interval would feel shorter than both a baseline and an unbounded interval. 
Methods and procedure. One hundred twenty one MTurk participants took part in this 3-
cell (Interval: baseline vs. bounded vs. unbounded) within subjects design. Participants were 
provided with a calendar and then indicated their perceived duration (using the same scale as in 
the main studies) for two intervals throughout the day in a random order. One of these intervals 
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(9:00am-10:00am) was unbounded, while the other (10:00am-11:00am) was bounded by a 
scheduled meeting. Participants also indicated the perceived duration of an average hour (“On 
average, how long do you consider the duration of an hour?) as a baseline estimate. Order was 
counterbalanced such that half of the participants evaluated the specific bounded and unbounded 
hours first and the other half provided their baseline time perception first. 
Results. I found a significant within subjects effect (F(1,120) = 8.88, p < .01), such that 
the bounded interval (M = 25.38) was perceived as significantly shorter than the unbounded 
interval (M = 29.20, t(120) = 2.89, p < .01) as well as the baseline (M = 29.26, t(120) = 2.98, p < 
.01). Importantly, the unbounded interval did not significantly differ from the baseline (|t(120)| < 
1). Thus, I find that a bounded interval is subjectively contracted compared to both a baseline 
and an unbounded interval, which did not differ from each other. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 2.2 – DESIRABLE & UNDESIRABLE BOUNDARIES 
In this study, I next sought to demonstrate that both desirable and undesirable boundary 
tasks contract time. This also helps to provide further evidence for the role of the endpoint as a 
driver of temporal contraction while also ruling out the potential effect of savoring for the 
boundary activity. That is, it could be that time feels shorter as consumers excitedly anticipate 
the scheduled task (Loewenstein 1987). If so, then one would expect the dread associated with 
anticipating a negative task to show the opposite (or no) effect.  
Method and procedure. One hundred and fifty one MTurk participants took part in this 3-
cell (Boundary task: desirable vs. undesirable vs. none) between subjects design. Participants in 
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the no boundary condition imagined that they had an hour available later today. Those in the 
boundary task conditions imagined that they had an hour available later today either before they 
needed to get ready to go to dinner with friends (desirable task) or before they needed to head to 
a dentist appointment (undesirable task). All participants then indicated their subjective time 
perception for the hour-long interval on the same subjective sliding scale used in prior studies. 
Results. I found a significant effect of boundary task (F(2, 148) = 8.88, p < .01) on 
perceived time. Planned contrasts revealed that the same length interval was rated as 
significantly shorter if it preceded a desirable boundary task (M = 30.30) than if there was not a 
boundary task (M = 45.06, t(148) = 3.09, p < .01). Further, as predicted, the time prior to an 
undesirable boundary task was also perceived as significantly shorter compared to no boundary 
task (M = 25.86, t(148) = 4.03, p < .01). While the undesirable task led to directionally greater 
temporal contraction than the desirable task, this difference was not significant (|t(148)| < 1). 
Thus, bounded time subjectively contracted irrespective of the desirability (and possible 
savorability) of the task.  
  
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 2.3 – DESIRABLE & UNDESIRABLE TARGET TASKS 
In this study, I sought to demonstrate that participants shy away from both positive and 
negative experiences during bounded time. In particular, if time feels insufficient for completing 
activities prior to boundary tasks, as I argue, then consumers should become less likely to engage 
in both fun, desirable tasks as well as unpleasant, undesirable tasks during bounded time. 
 Method and procedure. Two hundred ninety nine MTurk participants took part in this 2 
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(Interval: bounded vs. unbounded) x 2 (Activity: desirable vs. undesirable) between subjects 
design. All participants imagined that it was 7:00pm on a weeknight and that either their friend 
was coming by at 8:00pm (bounded) or that they did not have any plans for the evening 
(unbounded). Participants then indicated their likelihood of working on a “45 minute online 
training to complete for work that you've been dreading” (undesirable) or of watching a “45 
minute TV show that you've been looking forward to watching” (desirable) during the next hour 
(1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely).  
 Results. I found the anticipated significant main effect of boundary task (F(1, 295) = 
27.08 , p < .01) and no significant interaction (F(1, 295) = 1.88, p > .10). In particular, 
participants were less likely to take part in both the desirable (MBounded = 5.10, MUnbounded = 6.30, 
t(295) = 4.63, p < .01) and the undesirable activity prior to a boundary task (MBounded = 4.62, 
MUnbounded = 5.32, t(295) = 2.73, p < .01). 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY 2.4 – SHORT VS. LONG TARGET TASKS 
In this study, I sought to conceptually replicate the finding that consumers become less 
likely to engage in relatively long tasks but are just as likely to take part in relatively short tasks. 
Method and procedure. One hundred and sixty one participants took part in this 2 
(Interval: bounded vs. unbounded) x 2 (Activity: short vs. long) between subjects study. 
Participants imagined that they had an hour available (unbounded) or an hour available before 
leaving to get dinner with friends (bounded). Participants in the short activity condition read that 
they had only a few pages left on a book that they are reading whereas those in the long target 
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activity condition read instead that they had only a few chapters left to read. Participants then 
indicated how likely they would be to read their book during the next hour (1= extremely 
unlikely, 7 = extremely likely).  
Results. I found the predicted significant interaction (F(3, 157) = 4.02, p < .05). 
Conceptually replicating the results of Study 5a, participants were less likely to engage in the 
relatively long task of reading a few chapters of a book during a bounded interval (MBounded = 
4.59, MUnbounded = 5.77, t(157) = 3.50, p < .01) but were just as likely to engage in the shorter task 
of reading a few pages (MBounded =5.70, MUnbounded = 5.93, |t(157)| < 1).  
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